Sunday, September 30, 2007

A 3 minute 49 second history of the relationship between U.S. and Saudi Arabia

From the opening of the movie The Kingdom. You don't often get your history lessons so compressed. The movie is not bad either.

Report from (post-jihad?) Chechnya

From the New York Times:

Women stroll on sidewalks that did not exist last year. Teenagers cluster under newly installed street lights, chatting on cellphones. At a street corner, young men gather to race cars on a freshly paved road — a scene, considering that this is the capital of Chechnya, that feels out of place and from another time.

Throughout the city, local officials, most of them former rebels who waged a nationalist Islamic insurgency against Russia, lounge in cafes, assault rifles idled beside them.

Three years after a wave of guerrilla and terrorist attacks caused many analysts to say that Russia’s war against Chechen separatists could not be won, the republic has fallen almost fully under the control of the Kremlin and its indigenous proxies, led by Ramzan A. Kadyrov, the Chechen president.

Mr. Kadyrov’s human rights record is chilling, and allegations of his government’s patterns of brutality and impunity are widespread. Yet even his most severe critics say he has developed significant popular support, in part because of the clear changes that have accompanied his firm and fearsome rule.

As one Chechen told the Times:

“I compare how we used to live, and it is like we are in a fairy tale now,” said Zulika Aliyeva, 46, whose home was destroyed when Russia sacked Grozny in 1999 and 2000 and who spent years squatting in a ruined building. The building she moved to recently has been partly repaired.

Even experts are impressed:

Alexei Malashenko, an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center who studies Chechnya and recently visited the republic again, said the pace of change was astounding. “I couldn’t believe I was in Grozny,” he said.

The Times sums up what seems to have happened:

Russia’s defeat of the heart of the rebellion in Chechnya appears to flow, in the simplest sense, from a two-stage formula: extraordinary violence, followed by extraordinary investment. One corollary has been that allegations of human rights abuses by both Russia and its local allies have been largely ignored.

The Times credits Kadyrov for all this:

At the center of this formula has been Mr. Kadyrov, the rebel turned Kremlin ally who was widely labeled an illiterate bandit when he entered public life three years ago after his father, then the president, was assassinated.

Mr. Kadyrov, like the republic he leads, has defied the dark projections. As Chechnya’s president since this spring, he has become a populist who has managed to embrace Sufi Islam, Chechen ethnic identity and Kremlin authority simultaneously.

His success has a paradoxical quality to it. Paramilitary units in his government are suspected of kidnappings, torture and extrajudicial killings. Combat has not fully stopped and sporadic fighting has spread to neighboring republics. Large graves are full of unidentified remains — the victims, human rights advocates say, of a campaign to kill people suspected of being insurgents and punish their families.

So apparently do many locals:

Mr. Kadyrov, they said, has driven his government to work and forced government-hired contractors to meet his harsh deadlines. “They are afraid of Ramzan,” said Linda Saraliyeva, 28, one of Ms. Aliyeva’s neighbors. “What he has done in only one year, no one else has managed to do.”

As for Kadyrov himself, he credits Putin - and his harsh tactics. As he told the Russian GQ in 2005:
"I've already killed who I should have killed. And I will kill all of those standing behind them, as long as I myself am not killed or jailed. I will be killing as long as I live… Putin is a beauty. He thinks more about Chechnya than about any other republic. When my father was murdered, he [Putin] personally came down and went to the cemetery. Putin stopped the war. Putin should be made president for life. Strong rule is needed. Democracy is an American invention… Russians never obey their laws. Everyone stole, and only Khodorkovsky is in jail."
Some experts agree that Putin has been critical in the pacification process:
Mr. Malashenko, at the Carnegie Moscow Center, said he saw the Chechen president differently, saying that Mr. Kadyrov had become an essential national figure. But he added that he worried that Mr. Kadyrov’s standing was connected to his personal relationship with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.

If Mr. Putin leaves office next year at the end of his second term, as required by Russia’s Constitution, he said, Mr. Kadyrov’s fortunes, and his life, could be at risk. “He is hated in Moscow by a lot of people,” he said. “Only Ramzan is able to be a national leader. If he disappears, there will be a quarrel between the clans.”

Saturday, September 29, 2007

Another suicide bombing in Afghanistan

This time in Kabul. According to the New York Times report:

A suicide bomber wearing an Afghan military uniform approached a bus full of Afghan soldiers on their way to work early today and detonated a belt of explosives concealed beneath his clothes, officials said. The explosion transformed the vehicle into a smoldering husk of twisted steel and killed at least 27 people, including civilians, making it one of the deadliest suicide bombings in Afghanistan this year, officials said.
As the Times went on to note:

While suicide bombings in Iraq have been employed by the Sunni Arab insurgency to target the Shiite civilian population in an apparent effort to incite sectarian tensions, suicide bombers in Afghanistan have mostly attacked Afghan and foreign security forces.

Early this month, the United Nations said that in the first eight months of the year, Afghanistan had suffered a 69 percent increase in suicide bombings over the same period last year.

There have already been 100 bombings this year, killing at least 290 people, according to Afghan and international officials. A record 123 were carried out in 2006, inflicting some 305 deaths.

So what kind of Afghan - or foreigner, the case in half these bombings it appears - would blow himself up to kill his fellow citizens - or Muslims? As the Times went on to report:

A former Taliban commander told United Nations investigators that half of all suicide bombers had been foreigners and that “almost all undergo some form of training and preparation in madrasas based in Pakistan,” according to a United Nations report released earlier this month.

“Over 80 percent of suicide attackers pass through recruitment, training facilities or safe houses in North or South Waziristan en route to their targets inside Afghanistan,” the report added.

Many of the bombers appear to be young, poorly educated Afghans who had attended religious schools in Pakistan, investigators found. Suicide bombers also receive support from networks inside Afghanistan.

Reality sets in in Iraq: "The situation for al Qaeda today has shifted"

The Wall Street Journal's Robert L. Pollock talks to the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Here are some excerpts from his write-up of that conversation:

"The situation for al Qaeda today has shifted," the prime minister tells me with characteristic understatement. "It has lost a lot of the bases where it was operating freely."

In part this is because of the "surge" of American and Iraqi forces, whom Mr. Maliki thanks repeatedly for their sacrifices. But "these recent successes were also achieved because of the ordinary citizen. The residents in these areas discovered the reality of al Qaeda."

I ask if this change of heart on the part of the Sunnis -- dubbed the "Anbar Awakening" -- can survive the killing of charismatic leaders like Sattar Abu Risha, who was murdered by an al Qaeda bomb on Sept. 13. Yes, he assures me, the movement is strong. Abu Risha's killing only "brought all the tribes together in condemnation." The "national reconciliation" continues.

Asked about the risks of the government not monopolizing force he responded:

"We worried about creating new militias while we were confronting existing ones."

But he tells me there is a solution to the problem: "When members of the tribes carry arms they will be part of the structure of the state." That is, they do so as members of the Iraqi Security Forces, not as representatives of this or that sheikh.

About the Shiite militants in Iraq, Pollock wrote:

Mr. Maliki also deserves more credit than he gets for moving against the Shiite militias associated with Moqtada al-Sadr: "We deal with all Iraqis on the basis of whether they are abiding by the law or not abiding by the law."

As to what the Iraqi prime minister thought about Gen. Petraeus' recent testimony before Congress:

"I thought he tried to be realistic," he says of Gen. Petraeus. "He talked about the difficulties and the challenges, but also about the successes."

Asked about Iraq's neighbors and what role they've been playing, Maliki responded:

"At the beginning it wasn't an issue of getting more support but suffering from their negative interventions and their breaking of the principles of good neighbors." But he says things have started to change for the better because the surrounding countries now worry that troubles in Iraq could spread. They have "started a dialogue" with us, he says, adding "it is the duty of the entire world to work with Iraq."

Regarding the threat of terrorism in general, the prime minister cautioned that:

[The] world must form a "united front that supports democracy and confronts terror. There is no country that can say that terrorism has nothing to do with me."

So what did Pollock conclude from his interview:

Sure, it might be nice to have an Iraqi prime minister with a ready smile, flawless English and the unquestioned loyalty of all the country's people. But given the fractured nature of the country we found, and our many missteps -- particularly the "proportional representation" electoral system, which encouraged sectarian politics -- we should be thanking our lucky stars we ended up with Mr. Maliki. He is decent, thoughtful and courageous. He deserves our support, and patience.

As Maliki went on to say:

"In the 1860s, your country fought a great struggle of its own" -- Mr. Maliki reminded the world in an article for this page in June (yes, he really did draft it himself) -- "a civil war that took hundreds of thousands of lives but ended in the triumph of freedom and the birth of a great power."

Check out this map

Here is a map of the world showing recent suspicious activities around the world. It's updated every 460 seconds, and you can modify the time-frame it displays and the types of incidents, and search for more information about whatever is listed.

It's a terrific resource for analysts, students, teachers, etc.

Friday, September 28, 2007

The Saudi perspective on what's going on in the Middle East, and an Israeli response

From an interview with Charlie Rose as transcribed by the International Herald Tribune.

After establishing Prince Saud's bona fides:

CHARLIE ROSE: Prince Saud al-Faisal has been the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia since 1975. His country is an American ally in the Middle East. It has also played a key role in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. He was especially prophetic about the war in Iraq, warning in the year 2003 that it would destabilize the country and the region. Here's a part of what he said in interviews with CNN's Christiane Amanpour and the BBC's John Simpson.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: An occupation of Iraq is not a simple thing. How is 250,000 troops going to maintain order in a country like that? Especially if war leads to the instability that we think it will lead to, if it leads to the chaos that we think it will lead to. If the social order breaks down, who's going to be fighting whom? There's disorder, who's going to be paying the price for that?

We would hate to see American soldiers paying the price for an occupation that will do nothing but bring terrible consequences to everybody.

If change of regime comes with the destruction of Iraq, then you are solving one problem and creating five more problems. That is the consideration that we have to give, because we live in the region.

CHARLIE ROSE: And in a conversation with me in early 2004, he predicted the rise of ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iraq.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: And the fear that we had is that we knew that Iraq -- we knew that Iraq had many problems. Basically, the ethnic and sectarian situation in Iraq, which has been leaving Iraq on the edge of a pendulum, from complete chaos at one time to complete dictatorship at another time. And we thought that Saddam Hussein was not the cause of the problems of Iraq, he was a symptom.
Rose asked the Saudi foreign minister about the situation in Iraq:
CHARLIE ROSE: How long can you give the Maliki government and Ayatollah Sistani to come in and do something? How long can you live with the situation the way it is today?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: They should come yesterday, not today. I think it is already very late in the day. We have elections coming in the United States. We don't know what policies are going to be pursued in the United States, and certainly the United States is a prime mover and a prime actor in Iraq. And unless things move now, immediately, as I said, yesterday better than today, I'm afraid for the future. It doesn't bode well for all of us.

CHARLIE ROSE: What are you afraid for?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Well, I'm afraid of conflict, of this conflict spreading in the region, of the violence continuing unabated, and for the countries of the region to be sucked into the conflict. This is the nightmare that everybody sees in Iraq if things continue as they are.

CHARLIE ROSE: Some say you have 18 months to do something, because if there's a change of administration -- and there will be -- and it is any of the Democratic candidates is elected president, there will be a demand for withdrawal sooner rather than later. And if American troops leave, what are the consequences?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Well, from following the political dialogue in America about leaving or not leaving, I think there is some sort of a consensus emerging that you can't leave the country in disarray.

CHARLIE ROSE: Exactly. Well, you said that at the beginning, that we have to leave Iraq in a better shape than we found it. That seems like an awfully tall mountain to climb.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Well, if you jump into the fray, you have to pay the price for that.

CHARLIE ROSE: And what is that price now? What is it from the United States that we have to do?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Well, I don't want to presume that I would know what the United States has to do better than the United States government. They have set up a program of action that include national consensus, that resolves many of the issues, outstanding issues -- the issue of militias, the issue of equality in the eyes of the law for all Iraqis. These are the elements that have to be done.

As I said, it is not the concept of -- or the conception of what needs to be done in Iraq, it is just doing it. It's going ahead and doing it. If you're accused of imperialism -- and God forgive me for saying that -- be a (inaudible) imperialist.
So what does Prince Saud suggest the United States should do?
SAUD AL-FAISAL: You must make every Iraqi equal in the eyes of the law. You must disband militias. You must make everybody share in the benefits of economic well-being in Iraq. You must bring a government that does not have any restrictions on Iraqis of qualification just because they are Ba'athist or other political affiliation. You must bring the professional soldiers, the professional policemen, who had the experience of governing Iraq, brought back into (inaudible). These are the issues that have to be dealt with.
Rose also asked Prince Saud about what is going on in Anbar Province.
CHARLIE ROSE: The president likes to point to Anbar province now, where Sunni tribal leaders have recognized that joining forces with al Qaeda is counterproductive and they've turned on al Qaeda. Do you think that idea can spread?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: I hope so. We would hope the idea would spread everywhere, that cooperation with al Qaeda is counterproductive. It is dangerous. It is -- the violence that al Qaeda preaches brings no solutions to anybody. Whoever seeks to have a settlement of a problem certainly won't find it with al Qaeda. You will find only pure terror for no other purpose than to terrorize.
He asked Prince Saud about Al Qaeda:
CHARLIE ROSE: Are they stronger than they were before this war started?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: They have more causes to use for recruitment, for -- to justify their actions, to show that they are in a war to protect Muslims everywhere. And that is dangerous, of course. We want to reduce the amount of -- their capability to recruitment, because unless you go to the heart of the recruitment issue, you are really not solving the terrorist problem.

CHARLIE ROSE: As you know, some of those recruits come from your country. Why do you think they go to Iraq to fight for al Qaeda? Saudi young men?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: You know, when you see the violence that is happening in Iraq, in Palestine, and every day you see it on television and you see your brethren being killed, and it moves people. It is not the first time that this has happened, that people go to fight other wars in other countries. Many idealists from America went to the war in Spain...

CHARLIE ROSE: Yes, indeed.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: ... and lost their lives there. This is not unsimilar to that. But if you have...

CHARLIE ROSE: What do they see as the cause, though? If al Qaeda is not the cause...

SAUD AL-FAISAL: If you have somebody -- if you have somebody like al Qaeda utilizing this and directing it in a manner that is evil, that is pure evil, because al Qaeda has nothing to offer -- they certainly are not going to liberate Iraq. They went to Lebanon and created havoc in Lebanon. They went to other places and only killed -- who did they kill? They killed Muslims! Tens of times more Muslims than anybody else. They have nothing...
Rose then asked Prince Saud about Iran.
SAUD AL-FAISAL: We don't have an inherent opposition to Iran.

The policy that we would like to see Iran follow is a policy of fighting sectarianism, of not conceiving of themselves as the protectors of Shiites and -- in Iraq, for instance, because it's a false premise. If you are protecting Shiites in Iraq, you must remember that there are more Shiites as minorities in Sunni countries than majority in Muslim countries. And if you are worried about the Shiites, then you have to worry about these communities, which are now integrating in the society.

CHARLIE ROSE: You have said that the worst two things you can think about are, one, a nuclear Iran, and, two, an attack on Iran to prevent a nuclear Iran. Both bad options.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Indeed. And that is why we are at a quandary about this in the Middle East. They've promised that they are not going to build atomic weapons. We hope that it comes true, that they are not going to develop atomic weapons. But the spread of nuclear weapons is something that is so immensely dangerous, not only because of the threat of conflict with atomic weapons, which is so destructive, but because of the fears that they would fall into the wrong hands, into terrorist hands.
Finally Rose asked Prince Saud about the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
SAUD AL-FAISAL: This is conceived of as being so difficult, so intricate a problem, that only perhaps the involvement of a deity can solve a problem like that, and not mere mortals. Whereas, in fact, it is a border dispute, isn't it? They are fighting for the same territory. Why on earth this mystery?

CHARLIE ROSE: It's more than that, though.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: This complication? It is more than that? It has been brought to more than that. Now, religious issues put into it because of Jerusalem. Security issues are put as the prime concern for the solution of the problem. But there have been many border disputes settled, and many guarantees of security have been settled. Why not in Israel and Palestine?

CHARLIE ROSE: Well, your king, your friend, has made a significant effort with his own peace plan. Here's what Tom Friedman said writing in "The New York Times."

"I would humbly suggest the Saudi king make four stops. His first stop should be to Al Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam. There he, the custodian of Mecca and Medina, could reaffirm the Muslim claim to Arab East Jerusalem by praying at Al Aqsa. From there, he could travel to Ramallah and address the Palestinian parliament, making clear that the Abdullah initiative aims to give Palestinians the leverage to offer Israel peace, with the whole Arab world in return for full withdrawal.

And he might add that whatever deal the Palestinians cut with Israel regarding return of refugees or land swaps, so some settlements might stay in the West Bank in return for the Palestinians getting pieces of Israel, the Arab world would support.

From there, King Abdullah could helicopter to Yad Vashem, the memorial to the 6 million Jews killed in the Holocaust. A visit there would seal the deal with Israelis and affirm that the Muslim world rejects the Holocaust denialism of Iran.

Then he could go to the Israeli parliament and formally deliver his peace initiative."

What do you think of that idea?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: What if what Mr. Friedman says does not work?

CHARLIE ROSE: That's the problem, isn't it? Can't take that risk if it doesn't work.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: The issue -- the issue is not for somebody who's not in the conflict to take risks for peace. It is those in conflict that must risk peace.

Israel has lived now for the last six or seven decades on the concept of security based on brute power, brute military power. It is guaranteed that power by the United States. The United States assures Israel of keeping it capable of facing any combination of other forces, and we see the superiority in the military field that Israel has.

It is not for King Abdullah to risk for this peace. He presented a plan that would allow for the security of Israel in the Arab world, by having the Arab countries accept to make peace with Israel, that would lead to normalization, that would lead to working together, to cooperation.

The one who should take the risk for peace is Israel, instead of gambling on war to keep it. Why not accept...

CHARLIE ROSE: Everybody has to take a risk for peace, don't they?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: ...[King Abdullah] has come forward, put his proposal on the table, which was -- the risk was that he was -- that he was taking, that it was not going to be accepted or be popular, in his country or in other Islamic countries. But he took the risk. He came out with the proposal, and he convinced his Arab colleagues to accept the proposal.

It was out of hand refused by Israel, without any response or a different proposal from them that would be of equal consequence. You don't know how to act with something like that. Somebody who tells you that it's my security that is the arbiter for peace.

What is Israeli security? At one time, in their studies that they make, a security study, they said that their security extends from the Indus River to the Atlantic Ocean. How is that conceivable for a country of 3 million people, or 4 million people, or 5 million people, to conceive of these ideas? My God! We just want to live our lives in our country, build our country, have our citizens receive the education and economic level that we think they deserve. Where do these grandiose ideas come from? I don't know how they develop these ideas.

They are there to live as part of the Middle East. They must live with the Palestinian, not with the United States. They must achieve acceptance in the neighborhood that they have come to. They have come by force, but they cannot remain by force. They can only remain by acceptance. And this is what was offered to them, on the table, acceptance, normalization. A country as small as that has to have normal relations.

CHARLIE ROSE: You know what they would say, with respect? They would say that suicide bombings continue, the violence against Israelis continues...

SAUD AL-FAISAL: It continues because of the violence that's perpetrated...

CHARLIE ROSE: ... not just the territories, but also within Israel.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: It continues because it is perpetrated by the violence that they use against the Palestinians.

CHARLIE ROSE: Beyond what....

SAUD AL-FAISAL: For one shot fired from a house in the West Bank, the whole house is razed and the family is driven out. Every time that some crazy from one of the militias in the West Bank or Gaza fires a Katyusha missile that hits a farm, or maybe sometimes it injures somebody, the whole section of the city that it came from is destroyed. The infrastructure is -- Palestinians are living in misery. These are the most educated people in the Middle East. A man or a woman cannot know what their family is going to -- whether they can feed them, whether they can put them to school, whether they can clothe them, whether they can even see them grow up.

What on Earth would drive a girl, a 16-year-old girl, to put dynamite on herself and blow herself up? A 16-year-old girl! And she's a human being, just like the Israelis, just like that Saudis, just like the Americans. Except they're scared. They are scared. They see no way through for themselves to get anything in life, except by doing these violent -- violence. They have closed every option for them to work as human beings, with the dignity that this requires of human beings.

CHARLIE ROSE: All right. But what's wrong with what Tom Friedman suggested? Have King Abdullah...

SAUD AL-FAISAL: This is theater. What...

CHARLIE ROSE: Theater?

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Theater.

CHARLIE ROSE: Well, Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: Well, did he make peace for the Middle East?

CHARLIE ROSE: He made a peace between Egypt and Israel.

SAUD AL-FAISAL: All he could do was get Egyptian territory out of the Israelis. Although he was hoping for a breakthrough that would allow for total peace in the region.
At this point Rose got the Israeli response to King Abdullah's plan from the Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni.
CHARLIE ROSE: What's wrong with the Arab initiative? I mean, are you getting from Saudi Arabia, what they did in Mecca with respect to Hamas and Fatah and their effort to restart the Abdullah initiative? Does it have any potential?

TZIPI LIVNI: The Arab initiative represents the Arab narrative. And you asked me what's wrong. Well, basically, there are some good things in the Arab initiative. The problem is that it represent parameters and conditions for final status. I believe that it represents the Arab narrative, and it's OK. But I believe that the role of the Arab world is to support any outcome that comes from the Israeli/Palestinian dialogue. Instead of putting parameters and conditions, they need to help the pragmatic leaders.

Now, any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is based and is going to be based on compromises by both sides. So the Arab world, instead of putting, you know, this set of conditions, saying that there's a need to get '67 borders, Jerusalem the capital, plus something with refugees, need to support the dialogue.

And another idea I would like to say. According to the Arab initiative, there is a vision of normalization with Israel -- and this is a good vision -- normalization with Israel at the end of the peace agreement, or when peace between Israel and Palestinians comes.

I would like to offer something else to the Arab world. It's called normalization in stages. When Israel takes a step towards the Palestinians in terms of releasing prisoners, easing the life of the Palestinians, and since the current Palestinian government cannot deliver something in return, I think that the Arab world can help Israel to take the right steps. You're talking about Israeli leaders and the need to explain to the Israeli people why we are doing so when there is a very weak government on the other side.

If I can say that this is part of a process which doesn't relate only to the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, but it's going -- we have all the Arab world on board, I think that this can send the right message. But I am optimistic. This is just the beginning.





Thursday, September 27, 2007

Sheikh al-Oadah's Ramadan address to Osama

Sheikh Salman b. Fahd al-Oadah was a leading opposition cleric in Saudi Arabia until just recently. Among his followers were Osama Bin Laden. In the West he known as the cleric behind the fatwa urging Muslims to go fight jihad in Iraq in spite of their governments.

Now, after apparently recognizing the death and destruction he has helped visit upon the world, the Sheikh appears to have had a change of heart, if he was being sincere in a televised address he directed at Bin Laden on September 14, 2007, the second day of Ramadan. While I blogged about the Sheikh's remarks earlier, because I think his message is important, below I post the complete transcription of what he actually said. From Islam Today, a website the Sheikh now oversees:

Brother Osama:

How much blood has been spilled? How many innocent children, women, and old people have been killed, maimed, and expelled from their homes in the name of “al-Qaeda”?

Are you happy to meet Allah with this heavy burden on your shoulders? It is a weighty burden indeed – at least hundreds of thousands of innocent people, if not millions.

How could you wish for that? – after knowing that Allah’s Messenger said: “Whoever as much as kills a sparrow in vain will find it crying before Allah on the Day of Judgment: ‘My Lord! That person killed me in vain. He did not kill me for needful sustenance.”

This religion of ours comes to defense of the life of a sparrow. It can never accept the murder of innocent people, regardless of what supposed justification is given for it.

Didn’t you read where the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “One of the prophets once sat under a tree and was bitten by an ant. Because of this, he burnt the ant’s nest. Thereupon, Allah inspired to him: ‘Why not only the one ant?’ ” [Sahîh Muslim]

Allah revealed to that prophet: “What? Just because one ant had bitten you, you have set fire to an entire nation that extols Allah’s glory!” [Sahîh Muslim (2241)]

If this is the case for a nest of ants, consider how much worse it must be to visit harm upon human beings.

Who is responsible for all of those young Muslim, who are still in the bloom of their youth, with all the zeal of their age, who have strayed down a path they have no idea where it is headed?

The image of Islam today is tarnished. People around the world are saying how Islam teaches that those who do not accept it must be killed. They are also saying that the adherents of Salafi teachings kill Muslims who do not share their views.

However, the reality of Islam is that our Prophet (peace be upon him) did not kill the treacherous hypocrites in his midst, even though Allah had revealed to him who they were and informed him that they were destined for the deepest depths of Hell. Why did he stay his hand? He gave the following reason: “I will not have people saying that Muhammad kills his companions.”

Brother Osama, what happened on September 11 – crimes that we have condemned vociferously since that very day – was the murder of a few thousand people, possible a little less than three thousand. This is the number that dies in the airplanes as well as in the towers. By contrast, Muslim preachers – who remain unknown and unsung – have succeeded in guiding hundreds of thousands of people to Islam, people who have ever since been guided by the light of faith and whose hearts are filled with the love of Allah. Isn’t the difference between one who kills and one who guides obvious?

Our Lord tells us: “Whosoever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the Earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the lives of all mankind.” [Sûrah al-Mâ’idah: 32]

Guiding one soul to knowledge and faith is a momentous achievement. It is what will earn us great blessings.

Brother Osama, what is to be gained from the destruction of entire nations – which is what we are witnessing in Afghanistan and Iraq – seeing them torn them with plague and famine? What is to be gained from undermining their stability and every hope of a normal life? Three million refugees are packing into Syria and Jordan alone, not to mention those who are fleeing to the East and the West.

The nightmare of civil war which now reigns supreme in Afghanistan and Iraq brings no joy to the Muslims. When the Prophet (peace be upon him) heard about a man named Harb (meaning “war” in Arabic), he promptly changed his name to something else, because the Prophet hated war.

Allah says: “Fighting is prescribed for you, though you detest it.” [Sûrah al-Baqarah: 216]

War is something hateful that must only be resorted to under the most dire and compelling of circumstances when no other way is found.

Who stands to benefit from turning a country like Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia – or any other country for that matter – into a battlefield where no one feels safe? Is the goal to obstruct the government? Is that, then, the solution for anything?

Is this the plan – even if it is achieved by marching over the corpses of hundreds of thousands of people – police, soldiers, and civilians, even the common Muslims? Are their deaths to be shrugged off, saying: “They will be resurrected in the Hereafter based on the state of their hearts.”

Indeed, all of those who are slain will be resurrected based on the state of their hearts. The question we must ask ourselves, however, is in what state are we going to be resurrected? How are we going to find ourselves when we meet our Lord? How will it be for someone who has all those countless deaths weighing down upon him, whether he wants to own up to them or not?

The concern for conveying Islam’s message to humanity is one that can influence others and convince them. This is a far greater and far weightier concern than that of using brute force and violence to bend others to one’s will. “Allah sent His Messenger (peace be upon him) as a guide for humanity, not as a tax collector.” as `Umar b. `Abd al-`Azîz used to say.

Who is responsible – brother Osama – for promoting the culture of excommunication which has torn families asunder and has led to sons calling their fathers infidels? Who is responsible for fostering a culture of violence and murder that has led to people to shed the blood of their relatives in cold blood, rather than nurturing the spirit of love and tranquility that a Muslim family is supposed to have?

Who is responsible for the young men who leave their mothers crying; who abandon their wives; whose small children wake up every day asking when daddy is coming home? What answer can be given, when that father may very well be dead, or missing with no one knowing of his fate?

Who is responsible for Western governments pursuing every charitable project in the world, so that the orphans, the poor, and the needy throughout the globe are deprived of food, education, and other essential needs? Who is responsible – brother Osama – for filling the prisons of the Muslim world with our youth, a situation which will only breed more extremism, violence, and murder in our societies?

Muhammad (peace be upon him) – my source of guidance as well as yours – is what he came with not enough for you? He was sent as a mercy for all humanity. Allah says: “And We sent you merely as a mercy for all humanity.” [Sûrah al-Anbiyâ’: 107]

The word “mercy” is not to be found in the lexicon of war. Where is the mercy in murdering people? Where is the mercy in bombing places? Where is the mercy in making people and places into targets? Where is the mercy in turning many Muslim countries into battlefields?

The Prophet (peace be upon him) brought all of Arabia under his sway without a single slaughter, despite all of the battles that were waged against him. The number of people who were killed during the twenty-three years of his mission were less than two hundred people. The Muslims who were killed during that time by their enemies were many times in excess of that number.

What do a hundred people in Algeria, or double that number in Lebanon, or likewise in Saudi Arabia hope to achieve by carrying out acts of violence – or as they say, suicide attacks? These acts are futile.

Let us say – purely hypothetically – that these people manage to take power somewhere in the world. What then? What can people who have no life experience hope to achieve in the sphere of good governance? People who have no knowledge of Islamic law to support them and no understanding of domestic and foreign relations?

Is Islam only about guns and ammunition? Have your means become the ends themselves?

That ideology that so many young people have embraced in many parts of the world, is it revelation from Allah that cannot be questioned or reconsidered? Or is it merely a product of human effort that is subject to error and to being corrected?

Many of your brethren in Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere have come to see the end of the road for that ideology. They realize how destructive and dangerous it is. They have also found the courage to proclaim in their writings and on the air that they were mistaken and that the path they had been on was the path of error. They admit that it cannot lead to anything good. They have sought Allah’s forgiveness for what has passed and have expressed their sincere regrets for what they had done.

Those with brave hearts need just as much to have courageous minds.

Do you not hear the voices of the pious scholars, those who worship Allah day and night and are truly heedful of Allah – don’t you hear them crying out with the very same words that the Prophet (peace be upon him) used when Khâlid b. al-Walîd, the commander-in-chief of his army, acted in error: “O Allah! I plead my innocence to You from what Khâlid has done.”

These same words still echo after 1400 years in the cries of the scholars of Islam: “O Allah! I plead my innocence to You from what Osama is doing, and from those who affiliate themselves to his name or work under his banner.”

Life, Osama, should not be a single lesson. We must face numerous lessons throughout our lives, and these lessons are of a great variety.

I am no different than that of a lot of other people who are concerned with Muslim affairs. My heart pains me when I think of the number of young people who had so much potential – who would have made such great and original contributions to society, who had so much to offer that was constructive and positive – who have been turned into living bombs.

Here is the vital question that you need to ask yourself and that others have the right to demand and answer for: What have all these long years of suffering, tragedy, tears, and sacrifice actually achieved?

I ask Allah to bring everyone together upon the truth and right guidance. I pray that he guides us all to what pleases Him.

– Salman b. Fahd al-Oadah

Monday, September 24, 2007

Level-headed analysis of proposed Saudi arms deal

From F. Gregory Gause, a Saudi and something of a shaykh himself - as Director of the University of Vermont's the Middle East Studies program. Here are some excerpts from recent his testimony before Congress:

The Saudi government views the regional landscape essentially through a classic balance of power lens. It is preoccupied now with the growth of Iranian regional power, reflected in the expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon (through Hizballah) and among Palestinians (through Hamas). It is also concerned about the Iranian nuclear program.

Saudi Arabia, Gause argues, became concerned enough to become proactive in its foreign policy in late 2006, fearing that, as he writes, the "Iraq Study Group report might lead to an American withdrawal from Iraq, leaving the field open for the Iranians." As he continues:

It was then that Saudi diplomacy became more activist. On Iraq itself, one sign of that activism was King Abdallah’s declaration at the Arab summit in March 2007 that the foreign presence in Iraq is “illegitimate.” This can be seen as the entry price to dealing with Sunni groups in Iraq, which have consistently opposed the American presence in the country (even while some of those groups are now making tactical alliances with our forces there). While there is no evidence in public sources about Saudi government ties to Sunni tribes and groups, one can draw an interesting connection between the signs of Saudi activism in Iraq from late 2006 and the beginnings of the turn among many Sunni groups and tribes against al-Qaeda in Iraq’s influence. There is more circumstantial evidence of active Saudi support for efforts by opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, led by former Prime Minister Allawi, to form an alternative parliamentary coalition to oust Maliki from office.

The new Saudi activism on Iraq is paralleled by the Saudi initiative in February 2007 to try to bring Hamas and Fatah together in a coalition government in the Palestinian territories. While that initiative was a failure, it was inspired by Saudi fears that the split between the two Palestinian parties would drive Hamas further into the Iranian camp. Saudi support for the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, in the face of pressure from Hizballah and Syria, predates this spate of new diplomatic activism, but it is driven by the same factor. Hizballah is Iran’s closest ally in Lebanese politics; Syria is the Arab state with the closest relationship with Iran. Blocking an increase in their influence in Lebanon is part of the Saudi strategy to limit Iran’s reach in the region.

So are they plotting to attack Teheran with these new weapons. No, argues Gause:

Riyadh does not seek a direct confrontation with Teheran. King Abdallah has received a number of high-ranking Iranian officials, including President Ahmadinejad, during 2007. The Saudis have publicly acknowledged that they are consulting with Iran about a solution to the Lebanese political stand-off. The King even received a delegation of Hizballah leaders in early 2007. The Saudis fear the consequences of an open confrontation with Iran. They lived through that during the 1980’s, with Ayatallah Khomeini castigating them as “un-Islamic” puppets of the United States and Iran supporting Shi’a opposition groups throughout the Gulf. They did not like it then and would prefer to avoid it now. They know that, in any direct American-Iranian confrontation, Iranian responses would most likely be directed at U.S. allies in the Gulf. They seek to block Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in the Arab world more indirectly, but that is their goal.

As to whether Riyadh fears Iranian hegemony or Shi'a, this is what Gause surmises:

It is admittedly difficult to separate the issues. Iran tends to extend its influence in the Arab world through relations with Shi’a groups (though not exclusively – Hamas). With Iraqi politics now defined in sectarian terms, “blocking Iran” means “blocking Iran’s Shi’a Iraqi allies” by supporting Sunni Arab and more secular Iraqi groups. There have been a number of very high-profile Saudi clerics and salafi activists who have explicitly framed the Iraq issue as a sectarian fight, calling for Sunnis to rally to support their co-religionists and condemning the Shi’a as non-Muslims. However, the balance of the evidence indicates that the Saudi leadership is animated more by the fear of Iranian power than by sectarian animus against the Shi’a.

You can read his report to see how he arrives at this conclusion - but to sum it up, he's not just randomly guessing. In other words, the case is carefully made.

As to whether this means the Saudis will ally with Israel given that they now seem to share the same enemy, Gause writes:
It is true that nothing brings countries together like a common enemy. It seems that a high-ranking Saudi official (speculation centers on Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the U.S. and current national security adviser) met with a senior Israeli official (speculated to be Prime Minister Olmert) to discuss common interests in 2006. We should not, however, expect too much movement on this issue from the Saudi side. The Saudis feel constrained by their own public opinion, which remains decidedly anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian.
So what is the Saudi position then? According to Gause:
In the case of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the Saudis would demand up-front guarantees that their engagement with Israel would lead almost immediately to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza before they would take the significant step of publicly engaging the Israeli government in any serious way.

What about concerns that the monarchy in Saudi Arabia is on the verge of being overthrown by Al Qaeda or destabilized because of feuding in royal family? Don't bet on either happening in the foreseeable future, says Gause.

And can the Saudis really be considered reliable allies, isn't their interpretation of Islam the same as Al Qaeda's? Nope, says, Gause.

Since September 11, 2001, and more urgently since the QAP campaign against the regime began at home in May 2003, the Saudi government and the official clergy have preached (literally and figuratively) against extremism. They have condemned Usama bin Laden and his ideology. Saudi-funded international Muslim organizations have propounded interpretations of jihad that are almost parallel to Christian just war theories. The Saudi state has undertaken an extensive campaign to re-educate those among its citizens who have been arrested for involvement in radical activities. The official clergy has publicly discouraged Saudis from going to Iraq to fight. The Saudi media has condemned and ridiculed the radicals and given large amounts of airtime and print space to those who have recanted such views.
That said, as Gause duly notes:

It is difficult in a few years to delegitimate intellectual trends that date back decades. The celebration of jihad in the Saudi Islamic context dates back to the Saudi (and American) supported jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s...

While the Saudi government now campaigns against this interpretation of Islam and brutally suppresses those of its citizens who challenge the regime on the basis of this interpretation, it treads much more lightly around those Saudi religious scholars who, while not openly opposing the government, encourage intolerant and radical interpretations of Islam.

This is points out is why Saudis still comprise the largest number of foreign fighters in Iraq, because as long as they just advocate jihad against forces other than the Saudi government's they are still largely free to operate.

Now will the arms deal will make the Saudi regime even more unpopular because these arms are American? Gause is doubtful on this point too:

It is hard to imagine that, if this arms sale was not concluded, the regime’s opponents would think any better of it or that they would believe that the Saudi regime’s reliance on the United States was diminished. Will bin Laden’s criticism of the regime end if this arms sale does not go through? I doubt it. If the U.S. wants to distance itself from Riyadh, it will have to do much more than take back one arms deal. If we think we can maintain a close relationship with the Saudi government but shield it from the public opinion consequences of that relationship just by holding back one arms sale, we are fooling ourselves.

Finally, the bottomline of Shaykh Gause's analysis:

Aside from simple economic interest, to secure sales for American companies that would otherwise go elsewhere, is there any reason to support the deal? There might be one, but it is speculative and long-term. The arms sale would reassure the Saudi elite of continued American support, in the face of growing Iranian power and with the prospect of an American withdrawal, sometime down the line, from Iraq. Such reassurance could be an important lever of influence with the Saudi regime if, someday, Iran does acquire a nuclear capability. In the face of an Iranian nuclear breakout, the Saudi regime would be faced with two choices: a) rely on American promises of support in exchange for not trying to match the Iranians by getting their own nuclear forces, or b) try to acquire an off-the-shelf nuclear capability from an existing nuclear power. If the Saudis are confident in the American commitment, they would be more receptive to American pressure not to proliferate themselves. If they are not confident in the American commitment to their security, they would be more likely to try to go nuclear themselves.

Pakistan's latest gizmo

Pakistan


Smile, originally uploaded by KamiSyed (Back to work).

Pakistan


Lemo pani, originally uploaded by KamiSyed (Back to work).

More good news: Tuareg rebels in Niger and Mali are NOT branches of Al Qaeda

Why we optimists are having a series of field days!

Tuareg girl photographed by Abuja

Reuters reports:
Uprisings by Tuareg nomads in Niger and Mali may be destabilising the southern Sahara but there is little evidence to suggest direct links to Islamist militants also active in the world's biggest desert.

Tuareg-led rebels have launched attacks on military targets in the remote north of both countries in recent months, killing soldiers and civilians and taking hostages to demand more development for the impoverished region.

As Reuters notes, it is not that Islamist militants haven't tried to coopt the Tuareg struggle:

Salafist insurgents from Algeria, Tablighi clerics from Pakistan and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia -- all seen as potential threats by Western intelligence services -- have tried to gain a foothold in the region in recent years.

By and large, they have failed.

Now why would this be so? As the Reuters report goes on:

"Mali was Islamicised hundreds of years ago in the 11th-13th centuries and the form of Islam that has developed here is very devout, very tolerant, very open to dialogue with other civilisations," said one Western diplomat in Bamako.

In other words, like the Iraqi Sunnis, the Tuareg have no desire to submit themselves to the totalitarian interpretation of Islam that Al Qaeda insists people adopt wherever they go.

As Reuters goes on to report, Al Qaeda in North Africa has used Tuareg land in the past to train recruits in explosives and small weapons, but when they then tried to, as Reuters puts it, "introduce a foreign and violent form of Islam" to the Tuaregs, the rebels kicked their butts out (ok this was my paraphrase, this last clause). As Reuters goes on to note, it's not just the most extreme Salafis like Al Qaeda, who the Tuareg have resisted:

Attempts by other foreign forms of Islam to gain influence have also been resisted by Mali and Niger's Tuareg communities.

Wahabist preachers from Saudi Arabia who funded new mosques in the ancient Malian caravan town of Timbuktu wanted one of them to become the main site for Friday prayers, but local Imams recently rejected the proposal, an Islamic expert there said.

A few years ago Pakistani preachers from the Jama'at al-Tabligh missionary society, whose converts include British "shoe bomber" Richard Reid and the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh, tried to win over former rebels in Kidal, the seat of Mali's Tuareg insurgencies in the 1960s and 1990s.

Diplomats say they appear largely to have since given up.

Now this report passes the common sense test in my mind. Because it is the Tuareg, after all, who host the Festival of the Desert every year. And I have to say, I could never quite square reports about them being allied with Al Qaeda with all the music they make, their lifestyle (the men veil, the women don't), not to mention their fierce independence (they've run the desert caravans across the Sahara since Biblical times). I could never quite imagine Bin Laden and company suddenly being enthroned in Tuareg lands. I could imagine, however, all the little Bin Ladens, running off to the Festival, saying, "Come on Dad, let us go to at least this concert, Tuareg music is Islamic!"

Anyway, the Iraqi Sunnis get it, and it appears the Tuareg do too: that this, that these Al Qaeda people are never happy just being offered refuge, or someplace to live and educate their kids in safety and prosperity, what they also want is to rule, and in their particularly obnoxious way.

Be sure to check out the Festival of the Desert link to see for yourself what I mean about the Tuareg being, well, not exactly susceptible to the Al Qaeda ethos, not even remotely in my view.

Sunday, September 23, 2007

Bedouin thoughts


Bedouin thoughts, originally uploaded by BidWiya.

“Your Heritage is your identity, never disregard it”
-BidWiya

Isfahan, Iran


, originally uploaded by HORIZON.

to get lost in


to get lost in, originally uploaded by HORIZON.

More of Horizon's genius.

What is really happening in Pakistan

The Perfectlymadebirds Epic: dOvemaster Series One.

Saturday, September 22, 2007

In Baghdad at least, the glass is looking half-full

Well, to us optimists, at least. From the New York Times:

American and Iraqi forces control a little more than half of Baghdad’s neighborhoods but 8 percent are “free of enemy influence” and are being secured primarily by Iraqi units, according to a senior American commander.
As the Times continues:

In another 46 percent of the city’s neighborhoods, he said, American and Iraqi forces were able to prevent the area’s use by insurgent forces and protect the population. That is up from 42 percent in late June and 28 percent in late May. “The level of violence is way, way down,” General Fil said.

In 16 percent of Baghdad neighborhoods, American and Iraqi troops still face problems protecting residents, while in 30 percent operations are under way to “remove all enemy forces and eliminate resistance,” General Fil said.

Neighborhood militias are an important part of the new Baghdad security strategy. Yes, as critics point out, there is a risk these armed militias could eventually turn against the Iraqi security forces and Maliki-led government. Then again, they could also be co-opted.

I think it's still too early to tell how all this is going to pan out but for now, I'm among the cautiously optimistic.

Friday, September 21, 2007

"These are the last days of al-Qaeda"

Thus spoke Abu Omar al-Mahalawi, described as a senior figure in the Abu Mahal tribe, a Sunni tribe in Anbar Province, Iraq, an area that was formerly under the control of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

As Al-Jazeera, of all sources, goes on to report, the Sunni tribes are now reaching out to their Shia counterparts.

"Shia tribes are being attacked by al-Qaeda just like we are, so now is the time for Shia and Sunni to unite; after all we all belong to one tribal community in Iraq," Mahalawi reportedly told the newspaper.

Abu Mazen al-Obaidi, a member of the al-Obaidi tribe in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, told Al-Jazeera, "We discovered [al-Qaeda's] real agenda ... They did not come to liberate Iraq. The tribes know this now. They are our most dangerous enemy."

As Obaidi was quoted as saying, "[Al-Qaeda] came to fight the US occupation, they told us, but they have been unable to do that, so now they are killing Iraqis - Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. And all Iraqis will fight back. These are the last days of al-Qaeda."

Al-Mahalawi reportedly agreed, saying, "Al-Qaeda has been implementing the same strategy as the Iranian militias, which is to target Sunnis, destroy Arab unity, and create chaos in Iraq....all tribes, from al-Anbar to Salahadin to Diyala, are seeking unity to combat al-Qaeda."

Al-Jazeera goes on to report that now there is a Mosul Salvation Council as well, that hopes to combat al-Qaeda using the same approach the Anbar Salvation Council did. As Sheikh Fawaz al-Jarba, the head of this new council, told Al-Jazeera, "We are determined to clean Mosul from al-Qaeda's evil net."

Good for the tribes. I hope they succeed.

Thursday, September 20, 2007

Exclusive report from Afghanistan: Is the Taliban serious about being ready for peace?

Waillulah Rahmani, in Afghanistan

Waillulah Rahmani, a Kabul-based analyst who follows jihad and terrorism in Afghanistan, wrote in to speculate on prospects regarding the Taliban’s recent indications that they are ready to negotiate a peace settlement with the Karzai-led government.

The key issue, as he correctly points out, is whether the Taliban is really being serious here and whether this is same Taliban that is at war with NATO and Afghan forces.

Rahmani emails from Kabul:
Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the group divided into three subgroups – one group joined the government, another group – led by Mullah Omar - remained committed to Al Qaeda, and a third group hesitated. This last group didn’t know whether they should join the Afghan government, remain on their own, or to join the radical faction of the Taliban allied with Al Qaeda.

Even here in Afghanistan it is not at all clear who the Taliban claiming to be ready for peace negotiations represent.

But consider the context. The Taliban claim to have received some $20 million in exchange for the 23 Korean hostages they were holding. They have tried to widen the war they are fighting from the Pakistani border areas to cities around Kabul. They now have a strong presence in Ghazni, the province neighboring Kabul. The Taliban engaged in this fight are basically an arm of Al Qaeda.

Moreover, the fact that Bin Laden swore allegiance to Mullah Omar as Amir, or Leader of the Faithful, means that Mullah Omar is now the spiritual leader of Al Qaeda throughout the world.

This to me suggests that whoever is trying to negotiate a peace settlement with the government does not represent the Taliban in any meaningful sense. That is, the Taliban representing themselves as potential peace partners are not speaking for the Taliban under the command of Mullah Omar, the Taliban that is strongly aligned with Al Qaeda, and the Taliban that is waging war with NATO and Afghan forces.

At least that’s the way it looks here in Kabul.
Well, all I can say is, let’s hope Rahmani is wrong in his assessment as for his country’s sake, he hopes he’s wrong about this too.

Wednesday, September 19, 2007

How to deal with the Taliban

Interesting analysis by Ahto Lobjakas in Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty:

NATO officials like to portray insurgents in Afghanistan -- grouped under the name of the Taliban -- as a straightforward hierarchy in which Islamist zealots preside over opportunistic foot soldiers that they recruit using money, intimidation, or other means.

But, as Lobjakas goes on to report:

[T]here is evidence that the "Taliban" insurgency is a more complex phenomenon that needs a more nuanced approach.

He goes on to report about another type of Taliban fighter, one who has no idea what NATO is doing in Afghanistan and is only fighting the international security forces because he resents the Western military presence. As Lobjakas writes:

This is the view expressed by Hajji Gul, an elder in the Taliban-infested Dand district in Kandahar Province, in an interview on September 10.

Hajji Gul argues that the Taliban is essentially a flip side of the fiercely independent-minded Pashtun society. He says using force against it spawns resentment, and will lead to new recruits going to the Taliban.

"If you work with us, if you work with the government, if you work with the district and local people, [Taliban fighters] should never come to these districts, they should never destroy security here," he said. But "if you just bombard us, if you just fight the Taliban, the Taliban is going to increase in numbers. You should talk to the Taliban and make them happy."

Hajji Gul also criticizes the civilian fatalities that have sometimes accompanied ISAF operations. He extends his criticism to NATO's aggressive methods, its daily high-speed forays in armored convoys through local neighborhoods, which scare the locals and put their lives at risk. NATO says its cautionary measures are necessary for force protection.

Others Lobjakas interviewed corroborated Hul's view:

In Oruzgan Province, which has seen heavy fighting in recent years, Dutch officer Captain Tjip "Chip" Prins told me there is no such thing as a single, uniform "Taliban."...He said more than half of the fighters are locals who believe they are defending their livelihoods, or are following guidance they receive from their mullahs and elders, reacting against corruption among local officials, or seeking redress for other local or personal grievances.

Lobjakas concludes that local elections, if and when they are held, could be a way of addressing the grievances and sense of disconnect from the central government that spurn the insurgency.

Seems to me to be a simple enough solution to try.