Islam debated in Saudi Arabia

Here's a story about a radical Saudi cleric's personal evolution via the Christian Science Monitor:

In his youth, Abdullah Bejad al-Oteibi was devoted to a doctrinaire version of Islam. He regarded those who disagreed with him as unworthy Muslims.

But he's now grown up and writes articles that extol a more tolerant version of faith. Recently, one of his former fellow radicals called for his death:

[declaring] that Oteibi's "heretical" ideas meant that he should be brought to court and asked to recant. If he refused, Sheikh Barrak said, he should be put to death – an outcome, he added, that no Muslim would mourn.

As the Monitor reports:

The controversial fatwa and the swift condemnation it drew from Saudi and other Arab intellectuals offer a look into the shifting balance between extremist and moderate versions of Islam in Saudi society today...[coming] at a time when the government is taking steps to demonstrate its commitment to a moderate, nonviolent form of Islam. Last month, King Abdullah called for an interfaith conference among Muslims, Jews, and Christians, saying that Saudi clerics support the idea. And university officials have announced plans for an international conference of scholars next year to discuss moderation as an Islamic value.

As one commentator said:

"These kinds of fatwas are going out [of style]," Toraifi said of Barrak's declaration. "You don't see a rallying [around it]; it's not like in the '80s and '90s."

Oteibi himself said the fatwa was a sign of the extremist camp's panick "that its domination of [Saudi] society has subsided." As the Monitor report continued:

Aba Al Kheil [who was also targeted in the fatwa said the response] "shows that 'there are a lot of moderate people and thinkers out there who are against' clerics labeling their intellectual opponents as apostates, a capital crime under strictly applied interpretations of Islamic law."

The writer was referring to statements denouncing the fatwa from more than 90 Saudi intellectuals and almost 100 other Arab thinkers in Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. "[T]his fatwa is nothing but dark intellectual terrorism" by those who "think that Islam is exclusive to them and that they should be allowed to kill others," the Arab writers' statement said.

"We are trying our best," it added, "to make people understand the difference between Islam ... and some actions of some Muslims who give Islam a bad name."

And both men plan to continue calling for a moderate Islam.

As for the official reaction:

The [Saudi] government did not comment publicly. But Saudi Arabia's most senior religious leader, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh, extolled "the middle way" in Islam during remarks at a recent university seminar.

The mufti warned against "preachers of darkness" and said that "fanatical zeal cannot be considered part of religion, even if they [extremists] falsely pretend to be devout," Asharq Al Awsat newspaper reported.

The impact of Barrak's declaration was muted by the fact that he holds no official position in the Saudi religious establishment and is viewed by many as a marginal leader.

Al Qaeda's steady decline

Today's Washington Post reports on Al Qaeda's shame:

"More and more Muslim and Arab populations -- [including] clerics and scholars -- are questioning the value of al-Qaeda's program," Juan Carlos Zarate, deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, said Wednesday at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

What is the evidence for this assertion? As the Post report continues:

Zarate cited an Egyptian Islamic group, which includes former jihadist leaders, that recently published a series of books "highly critical of jihadists and al-Qaeda."

...Another example is a widely circulated letter to bin Laden from a leading Saudi cleric, Sheik Salman al-Ouda, released last September, in which the religious leader asked: "How much blood has been spent" by al-Qaeda attacks?

As the Post report continued:

[Zarate] said "former extremists" had begun a campaign to discredit violent extremism through the Quilliam Foundation, a London think tank, and, according to the organization's Web site, to "help foster a genuine British Islam, native to these islands, free from the bitter politics of the Arab and Muslim world...These challenges from within Muslim communities and even extremist circles will be insurmountable at the end of the day for al-Qaeda."

Scroll down this blog for more evidence of the growing rebellion against Al Qaeda.

Good news that at least one Times sees fit to print

That Times would be the London Times:

All across Iraq’s second city life is improving, a month after Iraqi troops began a surprise crackdown on the black-clad gangs who were allowed to flourish under the British military. The gunmen’s reign had enforced a strict set of religious codes.

Yet after three years of being terrified of kidnap, rape and murder – a fate that befell scores of other women – Nadyia Ahmed, 22, is among those enjoying a sense of normality, happy for the first time to attend her science course at Basra University. “I now have the university life that I heard of at high school before the war and always dreamt about,” she told The Times. “It was a nightmare because of these militiamen. I only attended class three days a week but now I look forward to going every day.”

She also no longer has to wear a headscarf. Under the strict Islamic rules imposed by the militias, women had to cover their hair, could not wear jeans or bright clothes and were strictly forbidden from sitting next to male colleagues on pain of death.

“All these men in black [who imposed the laws] just vanished from the university after this operation,” said Ms Ahmed. “Things have completely changed over the past week.”

Yet after three years of being terrified of kidnap, rape and murder – a fate that befell scores of other women – Nadyia Ahmed, 22, is among those enjoying a sense of normality, happy for the first time to attend her science course at Basra University. “I now have the university life that I heard of at high school before the war and always dreamt about,” she told The Times. “It was a nightmare because of these militiamen. I only attended class three days a week but now I look forward to going every day.”

She also no longer has to wear a headscarf. Under the strict Islamic rules imposed by the militias, women had to cover their hair, could not wear jeans or bright clothes and were strictly forbidden from sitting next to male colleagues on pain of death.

“All these men in black [who imposed the laws] just vanished from the university after this operation,” said Ms Ahmed. “Things have completely changed over the past week.”

This to me is why the sooner ground operations are tuned over to Iraqis the better:

For the first time in four years local residents have been emboldened to stand up to the militants and are turning in caches of weapons. Army checkpoints have been erected across Basra and traffic police are also out in force.

The security forces have also torn down many banners supporting al-Mahdi Army as well as portraits of its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, though some still remain in militia strongholds.

They know who the bad guys are. The Times report continues:

Many blame the British for allowing the militias to grow. “If they sent competent Iraqi troops to Basra in the early stages it would have limited the damage that happened in our city,” said Hameed Hashim, 39, who works for the South Oil Company.

Lieutenant-General Mohan al-Furaiji, Basra’s outgoing commander, said that his goal was “to turn Basra into a safe city without any armed groups” within two months. Local authorities would then have to improve the standard of living for the people of Basra, a city of 2.5 million, where raw sewage runs down the streets and the unemployment rate is as high as 80 per cent, despite countless projects funded by the British Government.

Iraqi forces can fight this fight in ways in which British or Americans cannot. Take, for example, this excerpt from the above report.

In the past month Iraqi troops have killed dozens of fighters, made 400 arrests and lost 12 soldiers. At the same time, it is thought that about 60 militia leaders have escaped across the border into Iran or are lying low outside Basra, working out their next move.

Were these "fighters" killed by British or American forces, they would have been labeled "Iraqis" or "civilians" unless the newspaper's staff actually saw them dying on the battlefield or openly carrying arms and wearing uniforms (not a chance). The 60 militia leaders would have been characterized as "clerics" given these were no doubt the "men in black" the Iraqi college student cited above was complaining about.

Here are more reports from the Times:

• Analysis: what a difference a month makes . . .

• Iraq: back in Basra

• British in Basra: heroes outstayed welcome

Multimedia

• Video: on the ground in Basra

Oil speculation or terrorism?

The New York Times reports:

A Japanese oil tanker was damaged Monday when it was attacked by a small boat in Middle Eastern waters off the coast of Yemen, the tanker’s owner said. Word of the attack helped to drive world oil prices to a new record.

Considering that nobody was injured, this was a Japanese vessel, and the Japanese aren't allowed to go on a war footing since they lost WWII, I'm going to go out on a limb now and admit I suspect this wasn't meant to do anything other than send oil prices higher.

Why newspapers trade in non-scandals

It's only off topic if you never take any headline seriously. John Podoretz posting on a Commentary blog:

The honest thing to do in these circumstances [when the facts aren't adding up to the assignment] is to kill the piece because you didn’t get the goods. That’s the problem with investigative journalism — often, the scandal is too confusing to be described in an exciting way, or it isn’t a scandal at all. But newspapers never kill the piece, because they spent too much money, too much time, and had too much hope to say, “You know what? This just didn’t pan out.”

More mind-altering images of Pakistan

Syed Muhammad Noman Bukhari sent along these photos he and Khwaja Fahd shot. He pointed out that not only is polo played in Pakistan, but this is where the sport began.

"Pakistan [has] such good houses?"

Thus read an Indian headline after the first Pakistani film in 43 years opened to wide audiences in India.

As the New York Times reports:

For 43 years no Pakistan-made film had been distributed commercially to movie theaters in India until the opening here of Mr. Mansoor’s movie, “Khuda Kay Liye” (“In the Name of God”)...

The Pakistani government imposed a ban on the distribution and broadcast of Indian movies after the war between the countries in 1965, one of three wars they have fought since the region was split by partition in 1947. No formal reciprocal order was issued by India, but initial political hostility to the idea of showing Pakistani films was superseded in later years by commercial considerations...

Despite the ban, pirated copies of Bollywood hits have always been hugely popular in Pakistan...

The effect has been a cultural two-way mirror dividing the countries, with Pakistan able to observe India (or a gaudier Bollywood version of India), but with Indians unable to see beyond their own frontiers.

As the Times report continues:

The film shows two brothers, both talented musicians in Lahore, growing apart as they embrace different readings of Islam. One falls under the influence of the local mullah, abandons his Sufi rock group and his rich, liberal parents in their interior-decorated home and heads off to join the Taliban.

The other leaves Pakistan to study music in Chicago, where he falls in love with the United States and marries an American. But he is then arrested and subjected to Abu Ghraib-style abuse by officials who are suspicious of his Muslim background, erroneously convinced that he played a role in planning the Sept. 11 attacks.

“That is the tragedy that a Muslim faces in these days,” Mr. Mansoor said. “We are beaten up by fundamentalists, with the label that we are too Western, and when we go out of the country, we are labeled as fundamentalists just because we have Pakistani names.”

Anyway, what was the Indian reaction to this film? Did Indians relate to the story? Apparently they did.

“People clapped here at the same places people clapped in Pakistan,” [the film's director reportedly] said.

Before you rush out to bet on the imminent reunification of the sub-continent, however, take heed of what Indian critic, Subhash K. Jha, had to say:

“Sadly, not too many people will be interested to see a film that reveals life as a Muslim..."

Why was this film distributed now? Shailendra Singh, the managing director of the company told the Times:

“We felt like we were being part of history,” he said.

It's nice to see this great divide narrowing after all these years. My in-laws trace their roots to Pakistan and my mother-in-law yearns to return to the childhood home she had to leave during Partition. She doesn't want to move back to Pakistan - the whole world opened up for her once she left. But she does long to see her old village. And stories like this will convince her she should.

Taliban sick of war says their former official

RFE/RL reports:

Islamic extremists who regularly post messages to a pro-al-Qaida website in Egypt are accusing Afghanistan's Taliban of straying from the path of global jihad.

...Internet criticisms of the Taliban follow a February statement from Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar announcing that his movement wants to maintain positive and "legitimate" relations with countries neighboring Afghanistan.

Mullah Omar, who heads a Taliban leadership council that was purportedly formed in 2003, also has said that the Taliban is exploring the possibility of holding peace negotiations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government.

"We want to have legitimate relations with all countries of the world," Mullah Omar's statement said. "We are not a threat to anyone. America believes that the Taliban is a threat to the whole world. And with this propaganda, America wants to use all other countries to advance their own interests."

RFE/RL interviewed the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Salam Zaief, to get his perspective:

"The conflict in Afghanistan doesn't mean [the Taliban] has to confront the world," Zaief continues. "Afghans are very tired of war. They want their homeland. They want peace in their country. They want independence. Whether they are Taliban or other Afghans, I don't think either wants to confront the entire international community. The Taliban doesn't want to rule the world."

...When asked what the Taliban thinks about Al-Qaida extremists trying to dictate Taliban policies in Afghanistan, Zaief said foreign extremists are more interested in their own benefit than what is good for Afghans.

"I think every Afghan now has the experience that with intolerance toward each other - if people do not live in peace and harmony with each other - the bloodshed and devastation will continue for a long time," Zaief said. "Nobody has the right to ignore the importance of stability in Afghanistan. They should at least not be making such irresponsible comments. [The al-Qaida bloggers] were raising the question of the foreign-troop presence in Afghanistan. But now, I think Afghans have to tolerate the presence of foreign troops in the country because they have no other option."

Although Zaief lives in Kabul and his location is known by Karzai's government, he is still considered a prominent member of the Taliban whose views reflect those of the Taliban leadership. But his remarks about the need for Afghans to tolerate the presence of foreign troops were not supported by a Taliban statement on the issue released on 11 March.

Al-Qaeda's (substantial) weaknesses

Here is how Brynjar Lia, of the FFI, assesses them. Lia, and his colleague Thomas Hegghammar (see post below) are two of the very best terrorism analysts in the world. Here is some of what he said at a recent lecture in Dubai:

A major weakness of groups such as al-Qaida is that it is always difficult to justify the killing of civilians. You will recall that there were mass demonstrations in Jordan and Morocco against al-Qaida following terrorist attacks by al-Qaida-related groups. A number of leading militant ideologues, from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan, to Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in Egypt, have severely censured al-Qaida for its acts of violence. Such criticism does not go unheeded. Ayman al-Zawahiri felt compelled to respond to al-Sharif’s criticism in a 200-page document that was posted on the Internet this year. Al-Zawahiri even described the document as being the most painful text he had ever written.

Such schisms are not new to al-Qaida. In fact, recently declassified documents reveal that there has been far more internal dissent in al-Qaida than has hitherto been acknowledged. These internal tensions started right after al-Qaida’s foundation, and have been a recurrent feature of the organisation. In recent years, issues such as the repeated massacres of Shia Muslim civilians in Iraq by al-Qaida’s Iraqi branch, have been a particularly controversial issue inside al-Qaida. Last year, there were also quite contradictory statements by al-Zawahiri and bin Laden regarding al-Qaida’s future course of action vis-à-vis Pakistan following the Lal-Masjid showdown during the summer of 2007.

Another inherent weakness of al-Qaida is that it does not seem able or willing to prepare for a future transition to politics. Al-Qaida’s appeal is totally dependent on the continuation of violence. Its brandname is simultaneous car bomb attacks with suicide bombers, not state building and party politics. Bin Laden has said that al-Qaida’s victory is simply to inflict pain and economic losses on the enemy, and undermine its political resolve. But this also means that al-Qaida’s appeal will diminish quickly wherever the population grow tired of violence that does not lead anywhere. At some point, al-Qaida’s image will inevitably fade; just as all extremist ideologies have a limited life span, so too does al-Qaida’s extremist interpretation of Islam. Some time in the future, al-Qaida will loose its attraction among the youth, and to pose as a jihadist will no longer be “cool”

Saudi Arabia versus jihadists

Thomas Hegghammar, a Norwegian expert on radicalism in Saudi Arabic, gave a lecture recently at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington DC, on what he's learned from his analysis of the fieldwork he's done in the kingdom. Here is an excerpt of a summary of what he said there:

The central driver behind Saudi efforts to combat the jihadist threat was al-Qaeda’s mass-casualty bombing attacks inside Saudi Arabia in May and November, 2003. Rather than the 9/11 attacks, it was only after the 2003 violence that the state recognized the extent of the jihadi threat to the Kingdom itself. Hegghammer argues that the Saudi government has begun to get a handle on the situation in the Kingdom, in part because the domestic jihadis badly overestimated their own strength. They were never able to recruit successfully inside Saudi Arabia, and the regime has successfully marginalized their support still further by portraying them as revolutionaries. Still, the Saudi government’s response to jihadi violence is to reemphasize its Islamic credentials rather than walk away from them. For this reason, the Saudi government will continue to work to alternately coopt and coerce whatever religiously inspired opposition movements emerge in the Kingdom.

The French: Iraq not the new jihadist factory

From today's New York Times:

[In] 2005, French authorities predicted a new and dangerous threat: young Muslims lured to the Iraqi battlefields who would return, radicalized, to use their newfound battlefield skills in terrorist acts inside France.

Dominique de Villepin, then the interior minister, singled out the cell in a speech two months later as proof of a risk that Iraqi-trained jihadists would “come back to France, armed with their experience, to carry out attacks.”

That was then. This is what the French (and "other Europeans") think now:

...French and other European intelligence and law enforcement officials are saying those fears appear to be overblown. The logistical challenges and expense of reaching Iraq has been one deterrent, they said, particularly with Syria’s making episodic efforts to halt the use of its territory as a transit route. Compared with the thousands of European Muslims who joined the fight in Afghanistan in the 1990s through organized networks in Britain, the number of fighters going to Iraq has been extremely small, according to senior French intelligence officials.

Another factor, the officials say, is that Iraqi insurgents currently neither need nor welcome European Muslims who lack military training and good Arabic-language skills — except if they are willing to conduct suicide missions.

The nature of the battle has also changed, making Iraq an alien destination for many would-be insurgents. The fight in Iraq is no longer just a jihad against foreign occupiers, but also a confusing civil war pitting Muslim against Muslim.

So does this mean the Europeans think there is no longer a terrorist threat? Not exactly, as the Times makes clear:

“At the moment, the major threat to Europe is coming from elsewhere — Pakistan, Afghanistan and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” a terrorist organization based in North Africa, said Judge Bruguière, who now works for the European Union investigating terrorist financing.

Now that said, the European authorities do now seem to think the threat has diminished. And notice the reason why:

...law enforcement authorities, particularly in countries like France, Italy and Spain, say they are convinced that their sweeping legal authority to eavesdrop, make arrests, hold suspects for long periods of time and win convictions on the vague charge of association with a terrorist enterprise has made it easier to take preventive action.

“It’s impossible to give numbers, but fewer young people are leaving Italy and other European countries to wage jihad in Iraq,” said Armando Spataro, Italy’s senior counterterrorism magistrate. “I’m convinced part of the reason is that we’ve been successful in arresting and prosecuting people, even before they go to Iraq.”