Cordesman's advice may be harsh but, as always, it's worth hearing

You may not agree with everything he says but, as usual, I think Anthony Cordesman's analysis of the current situation in Iraq bears hearing out. Cordesman is the highly regarded Gulf military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Here are some excerpts from his recent report:

Like it or not, the US not only has an enduring strategic interest in Iraq and the Gulf, it has a moral and ethnical obligation to some 27 million Iraqis. The US invaded Iraq for all the wrong reasons, and then proceeded to "transform" it in ways that have done immense damage to the Iraqi people. As has been all too clear from the start, anger at Saddam Hussein's regime does not translate into support for a US-led invasion and the US has won little Arab Shi'ite or Arab Sunni admiration for its actions since the war.

This is all too clear in how virtually everyone outside the US now judges the war. Even if the US succeeds in its current "surge" in Iraq -- and then in helping to create some degree of lasting national stability and unity -- most Iraqis, citizens of the Middle East, and Europeans will still perceive the US as having "lost" the war. The Gallup, PEW, Oxford Analytic, CFR, and virtually every other poll that has addressed the issue shows the world perceives the US as having ignored the UN, failed to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, being unready for stability operations and nation building, and as having caused massive amounts of unnecessary suffering.

The US can only counter this image if it shows the world that it is willing to stay as long as there is any credible chance of helping the Iraqis through what is likely to be at least a half decade more of difficult transition. This means taking the time to build truly capable Iraqi governance, military forces, police forces, and an effective rule of law. It means phasing down the US military presence at a measured pace. It means accepting the fact that progress must move largely at an Iraqi pace, not according to rigid, US-dictated, benchmarks. It means years of economic aid.

The US can, and may well, lose quickly and be forced to leave in defeat. If it does, it must then still live with deep involvement in Iraq and the Gulf, with several more decades of global economic dependence on Gulf energy exports, with an Iran that will do its best to capitalize on the situation, and with what Islamist extremists all over the world will see as a major victory. It will also have to live with the reality of having been the major cause of the suffering of millions of Iraqis. The odds are not good, but preemptive acceptance of defeat is almost certainly a worse course of action.

His whole report is available here.