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Thursday, March 15, 2007

A bad omen in the flying imams 'discrimination' suit?

Katherine Kersten, columnist at the Minneapolis Star Tribune, has a must-read piece today: "The real target of the 6 imams 'discrimination' suit." First she recalls for readers what inspired this lawsuit.

Recall the November 2006 incident that gave rise to the suit. The imams engaged in a variety of suspicious behaviors while boarding a US Airways flight, according to the airport police report. Some prayed loudly in the gate area, spoke angrily about the United States and Saddam, switched seats and sat in the 9/11 hijackers' configuration, and unnecessarily requested seatbelt extenders that could be used as weapons, according to witness reports and US Airways spokeswoman Andrea Rader.
Almost immediately, suspicions abounded that the only reason the imams had acted in this strange manner was to set up the deep-pocketed airlines for a lawsuit. But there may be another angle to imam's action that is truly ominous.

This other angle comes into focus, as Kersten points out, when you see the other defendants aside from the airlines that the suit names - the "John Doe" defendants. These are the people who, as the legal filing itself reads, "contacted U.S. Airways to report the alleged 'suspicious' behavior of Plaintiffs' performing their prayer at the airport terminal."

As Kersten reports, the lawsuit describes these "John Doe" defendants as "an older couple who was sitting [near the imams] and purposely turn[ed] around to watch" as they prayed. "The gentleman ('John Doe') in the couple ... picked up his cellular phone and made a phone call while watching the Plaintiffs pray," then "moved to a corner" and "kept talking into his cellular phone."

Kersten draws the logical - and disturbing - inference:

The imams' attempt to bully ordinary passengers marks an alarming new front in the war on airline security. Average folks, "John Does" like you and me, initially observed and reported the imams' suspicious behavior on Nov. 20. Such people are our "first responders" against terrorism. But the imams' suit may frighten such individuals into silence, as they seek to avoid the nightmare of being labeled bigots and named as defendants.

Update: This story gets even creepier. As Powerline reports, it turns out that the lawyer representing the flying imams, Omar Mohammedi, is the president of the New York chapter of the Council of American-Islamic Relations, otherwise known as CAIR. As Powerline reports:

CAIR is a well-funded organization, from Middle Eastern as well as American sources. It is willing and able to fund litigation, and has a history of using litigation to silence its opponents. Any case that Mohammedi may bring against the passengers who reported the imams' suspicious behavior will be a terrible lawsuit. The imams won't win it. But getting even a terrible lawsuit dismissed often costs thousands, even tens of thousands, of dollars. That's not much money to a well-funded advocacy group like CAIR, but it is a great deal of money to most average citizens. Not to mention, of course, the understandable horror most people have of becoming embroiled in a lawsuit.


Khalid Sheikh Mohammed confesses

KSM sometime before his arrest in March 2003
KSM after he was captured

It's all over the news and blogosphere but if you still somehow missed it, KSM, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, has confessed to orchestrating the 9/11 attacks and a whole host of others as well. You can read his statement here. If you don't have time to read the whole transcript, his confession begins on page 17.

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Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Nek Mohammed: the life and death of a Waziri tribal leader

To illustrate the type of ties that exist between the pro-Taliban leaders in Waziristan and Pakistan, in the photos below, you can track the life of Nek Mohammed.

At the time of his death, he was a 27-year-old Waziristan tribal leader. Waziristan is the tribe-controlled region of Pakistan where many people think bin Laden may be hiding. As the BBC reported at the time of his death in 2004:

[Nek Mohammed] came to prominence as the commander of a pro-Taleban group of Pakistani tribesmen, who resisted six military operations by Pakistan troops hunting al-Qaeda and Taleban suspects in the South Waziristan region, bordering Afghanistan.

Accused of sheltering foreign militants from Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Afghanistan and some Arab countries, Nek Mohammad and several of his men were punished when the Pakistani government demolished their homes and issued warrants for their arrest.

However, the army was forced to strike a deal with him in April after suffering significant human and material losses in several rounds of fighting.
Mohammad had his moment of glory when Lt Gen Safdar Hussain, commander of the forces battling the militants in South Waziristan, publicly embraced him in the presence of several thousand tribesmen to announce a reconciliation.

Though Mohammad renounced militancy in return for an amnesty from the military, the deal raised his stature in the eyes of tribal people.

...But it was not long before disagreement over the terms of the unwritten agreement once more pitted Mohammad against the armed forces. He said he was unable to produce fugitive foreign militants before the authorities for registration.

The military retaliated by revoking his amnesty. Orders to kill or capture him were issued as the military launched its biggest operation against al-Qaeda-linked foreign militants and their Pakistani supporters on 11 June.

A week later, Nek Mohammad was dead.


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Nek Mohammad's funeral (photo by Yawar)


Nek Mohammad (photo by Yawar)


Nek Mohammad with Pakistani Army Commander (photo by Yawar)

Pakistan's double-edged sword

Ken Silverstein at Harper's has must-read piece on Pakistan. It is a few weeks old. But nevertheless...You should read it to get a sense of the difficult position Musharaff is in.
As Silverstein observes:

We should be concerned about reports of increased Al Qaeda activity in Pakistani tribal areas. But is Pakistan really to blame for our failures to stomp out Al Qaeda? Other countries, as former senior CIA official Michael Scheuer reminded me, do not look at the world from the same point of view as the United States. “The first duty of any intelligence agency,” he said, “is to protect the national interest. Pakistan is not going to destroy the Taliban because at some point they would like to see the Taliban back in power. They cannot tolerate a pro-Indian, pro-American, pro-Russian, pro-Iranian government in Afghanistan. They already have an unstable Western border and have to worry about a country of one billion Hindus that has nuclear bombs.”
At the same time, as Silverstein goes on to report:
Hundreds of suspected terrorists have been killed or captured by Pakistani authorities since September 2001. “Individuals detained in 2004 haveprovided leads that aided investigations by security agencies around the world,” said a 2004 U.S. government report. Most notably, the ISI has helped capture three of Al Qaeda's most important figures: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi Binalshibh. All three were turned over to the CIA. “Every time we have brought someone important to justice, the first one through the door is Pakistani,”said Milt Bearden, a former CIA official.

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Iran


WINDOW & CERAMIC, originally uploaded by HORIZON.

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

The trouble with tracking terrorists...

Is that law enforcement agents are expected to arrest them before they carry out their intentions. This means that investigators have to rely on intelligence as opposed to evidence, which posses an irreconcilable dilemma as Sandra Bell, head of Homeland Security for Britain's Royal United Services Institute, explains in yesterday's Wall Street Journal.

To give you some idea of the scale of the problem Britain faces, Bell says there are currently around 40 terror trials pending, involving some 100 defendants. Couple this with the news that the head of Britain's MI5 released in November - that British intelligence estimates that there may be as many as 200 active terror networks in Britain, involving some 1,600 individuals.

Because law enforcement is expected to disrupt terror plots before they occur, police have to rely on intelligence - intelligence that can be easily manipulated, misinterpreted, and difficult if not impossible to cross check. The consequence of this inevitable dilemma, Bell observes, is that innocent people can be arrested or detained; and guilty people may go free.

To illustrate her point, she cites two examples. The first is the case of the two Muslim brothers whose home some 250 police stormed in June 2005 under suspicion that they were plotting to use chemical weapons. During the raid, one of the brothers was shot in the shoulder. Apparently the intelligence the police were relying on was mistaken as the brothers were later released. Though an independent investigation exonerated the police of any wrongdoing in the case, as Bell writes, "[this] did little to dispel Muslim complaints that they are being unfairly singled out."

While this case was indeed unfortunate, as Bell continues:


Now consider the other extreme: the case of Mohammad Sidique Khan, a Leeds born primary school teaching assistant and the ringleader of the July 7, 2005, bombings that killed 52 people in London. Khan had come to MI5's notice more than a year before the bombings when he was spotted in the company of other terrorist suspects. He was, however, just one of hundreds of suspects caught up in one of many surveillance operations. At the time he was nothing more than a blurred image on a surveillance tape. Investigators did not even know his name. Since the intelligence services had substantial information on the other terror suspects but not on Khan, he was left alone. Given their finite resources, investigators had to prioritize.
Again, investigators were later exonerated of any wrongdoing but, as Bell points out, this did little to mollify public outrage that "[such] a major intelligence gaffe" could occur, and one that resulted in the loss of 52 lives.

Unfortunately, as Bell points out, no new laws or tougher prison sentences "will change the underlying dilemma: the need for the police to act on intelligence rather than evidence to stop potentially devastating attacks."

What to do? Bell''s only recommendation is that authorities should be more open and the public should be more understanding:

They [the authorities] need to have the courage to acknowledge that mistakes will be made and the humility to apologize for them when they occur. And the British public needs to understand that we are moving into a new, grim normality.
While her advice may not seem all that brilliant, does anybody have a better suggestion?

Hamas: Don't believe al Qaeda

We're still committed to Israel's destruction.

Reuters reports that Hamas is objecting to yesterday's criticisms by al Qaeda that it is, "[now] serving U.S. interests by agreeing to respect past Palestinian peace accords with Israel":

"We will not betray promises we made to God to continue the path of Jihad and resistance until the liberation of Palestine, all of Palestine," Hamas said in a statement, in a clear reference to Israel as well as to the occupied West Bank.
Al Qaeda second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, said in an Internet statement on Sunday that by agreeing last month in Mecca to respect earlier agreements forged between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, Hamas, now the ruling party in the PA, had betrayed its original purpose to restore the land that is today Israel back to the domain of Islam.

Saudi Arabia had brokered the Mecca accord in hopes that it would bring about an end to the inter-Palestinian fighting that has claimed the lives of some 90 Palestinians in recent months.

As far as Zawahiri was concerned, however, the Mecca accord was no more than "an American scheme....to remove the biggest reason for Muslim hatred (of the United States), namely the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

"They [Hamas] have ditched the movement of martyrdom operations ... for a government that plays with words in palace halls," the al Qaeda leader said in his Internet statement.

In response to Zawahiri's criticisms, Hamas issued a statement saying:
"Zawahri's recent statements were wrong ...Hamas is still the group you knew when it was founded and it will never abandon its path."
Hamas was apparently referring to the principles it set out in its "founding covenant."

In Article 11, for example, Hamas spells out exactly why it can never accept a permanent Jewish state in the land it calls Palestine:
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem generations until Judgement Day.
I personally don't think you can even begin to understand the Palestinian-Israeli conflict until you read the Hamas charter in its entirety. The covenant will give you a flavor of why Hamas believes that the Jews must be opposed. For example, there are the reasons stated in Article 22:

For a long time, the enemies [i.e., the Jews] have been planning, skillfully and with precision, for the achievement of what they have attained. They took into consideration the causes affecting the current of events. They strived to amass great and substantive material wealth which they devoted to the realisation of their dream. With their money, they took control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world with the purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries inorder to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there.

You may speak as much as you want about regional and world wars. They were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, making
financial gains and controlling resources. They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it.

And there's more. In Article 28:

The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies greatly in its infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the Freemasons, The Rotary and Lions clubs, and other sabotage groups. All these organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism andaccording to its instructions. They aim at undermining societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences, deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion.
But again, read the whole thing. It will explain a lot. And don't forget, this is the charter of the organization that now controls a majority of the seats in the Palestinian legislature.

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Monday, March 12, 2007

Good news from Afghanistan?

The New York Times (no less) is reporting:

The departing American ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald E. Neumann, said Monday that he did not see the Taliban as the big threat it appeared to represent a year or two ago, and that he was leaving feeling “reasonably optimistic” about the state of the insurgency and the country’s progress.

“We spent a lot of last year worrying about this year,” he told a small group of journalists in the refurbished old embassy building, which reopened recently. “We will certainly face hard fighting in the south,” he said, “but I am going away feeling reasonably optimistic.”

More British and American troops had been supplied for the effort, he noted, providing the needed military support for the anti-insurgency effort, especially in the southern part of the country by fighters associated with the former Taliban rulers.

“We will see a hard fight,” Mr. Neumann said, but added, “We have the basics of what it takes.”



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Sunday, March 11, 2007

Who is the bomb thrower again?


I've been in Mexico the past several days with only sporadic Internet access, which is fine as far as I'm concerned because I don't know what to make of the summit on Iraq yet, the US meeting with Iran, or the renewed efforts to forge peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

But I have to put up with the hassles of posting from this location to alert you to Christopher Hitchen's must-read in the latest issue of Slate. He writes about the left-leaning media's reaction to Ayaan Hirsi Ali's recently released and bestselling book Infidel.

Recall that Ayaan Hirsi Ali was the Somali Muslim who eventually became a Dutch parliamentarian. She ended up fleeing Holland in fear for her life after an Islamist extremist gunned down her partner, the producer of a screenplay she had written which was critical of the way the Islamic world treats women. Ali had some idea of what she was talking about in the movie as she herself had been raised in this world and considered herself to be one of its victims in that she had been forced to undergo both genital mutilation and marriage to a relative she wasn't interested in.

Ali came to believe her life was in danger in the Netherlands after she learned that her partner's murderer, a Dutch Muslim, had left behind a note, a note that he pinned to her partner's corpse using the same knife with which he had tried to behead him.

In this note, her partner's murderer threatened Ali (and, of course, Western governments and Jews). Ali received other threats as well from those purporting to be her former coreligionists resident in Holland, but nevertheless, in 2006, a Dutch judge ordered that she had to abandon the secure location in which she was living because some of her neighbors had complained that her presence there was disrupting their otherwise calm lives.

This led to Ali resigning from her parliament post and accepting a job at a conservative think tank in the United States.

With this background, now I can quote Hitchens:

In her book, Ayaan Hirsi Ali says the following: "I left the world of faith, of genital cutting and forced marriage for the world of reason and sexual emancipation. After making this voyage I know that one of these two worlds is simply better than the other. Not for its gaudy gadgetry, but for its fundamental values." This is a fairly representative quotation. She has her criticisms of the West, but she prefers it to a society where women are subordinate, censorship is pervasive, and violence is officially preached against unbelievers.
At this point Hitchens quotes Lorraine Ali of Newsweek who had written of Ali's book: "It's ironic that this would-be 'infidel' often sounds as single-minded and reactionary as the zealots she's worked so hard to oppose."

Hitchens then launches his assault against those members of the media who - reading between the lines a bit here - can't it would seem bring themselves to support anyone who would find safe haven at the American Enterprise Institute (a conservative think tank in Washington):
I would challenge the author to give her definition of irony and also to produce a single statement from Hirsi Ali that would come close to materializing that claim. Accompanying the article is a typically superficial Newsweek Q&A sidebar, which is almost unbelievably headed: "A Bombthrower's Life." The subject of this absurd headline is a woman who has been threatened with horrific violence, by Muslims varying from moderate to extreme, ever since she was a little girl. She has more recently had to see a Dutch friend butchered in the street, been told that she is next, and now has to live with bodyguards in Washington, D.C. She has never used or advocated violence. Yet to whom does Newsweek refer as the "Bombthrower"? It's always the same with these bogus equivalences: They start by pretending loftily to find no difference between aggressor and victim, and they end up by saying that it's the victim of violence who is "really" inciting it.



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Thursday, March 8, 2007

Rumors are circulating that Cheney may not be Svengali afterall

Jim Hoaglund in today's Washington Post says that speculation is increasing, inside and out of the Beltway, that Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has now replaced Vice President Cheney as the person with the most influence over President Bush.

Rice, according to Hoaglund's sources, is supposed to have "told Bush in January that he should devote his final two years in office to seeking diplomatic agreements with North Korea and Iran and an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. That account emphasizes that Rice is not simply outflanking Cheney in intermittent internal policy battles but has won full agreement and support from the president on the strategic goals and methods she and her diplomats are pursuing."

Hoaglund points out that "Bush has always been much more the decision maker than the Cheney-as-puppeteer image conveyed" and to prove his point, he cites a number of occasions on which Bush clearly did not follow Cheney's lead. He didn't take Cheney's advice to go back to the UN to get a second resolution to sanction the use of force in Iraq back in 2003. He didn't listen to Cheney in the aftermath of the invasion either, taking instead, as Hoaglund says, the "distastrous" counsel of proconsul L. Paul Bremer and others.

Hoaglund also claims that Cheney has had a "more relaxed attitude" towards Iran since he entered office because of his tenure at Halliburton, the implication being it was probably not Cheney who was urging Bush to take a hardline stance vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic.

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Has a former Iranian commander who organized Hezbollah defected to the West?

The Washington Post has a must-read write-up today on Ali Rez Asgari, described as "a former Iranian deputy defense minister who once commanded the Revolutionary Guard." According to the Post, Asgari has left Iran and "is cooperating with Western intelligence agencies, providing information on Hezbollah and Iran's ties to the organization."

Iranian officials, not surprisingly, are claiming that Israel or the US must have captured Asgari or at least paid him to defect. The Post's source contends, however, that he is "willingly cooperating." Israel denies having anything to do with his disappearance.

If Asgari is talking, he would appear to be someone that would have "high-value" information. As the Post reports:

Asgari served in the Iranian government until early 2005 under then-President Mohammad Khatami. Asgari's background suggests that he would have deep knowledge of Iran's national security infrastructure, conventional weapons arsenal and ties to Hezbollah in south Lebanon. Iranian officials said he was not involved in the country's nuclear program, and the senior U.S. official said Asgari is not being questioned about it. Former officers with Israel's Mossad spy agency said yesterday that Asgari had been instrumental in the founding of Hezbollah in the 1980s, around the time of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.
An Iranian official however, who insisted on remaining anonymous, suggested that any information Asgari may have would at this point be stale as, to quote this official, "he has been out of the loop for four or five years now."

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More news on the Iraqi soccer deaths

Zach over at Footballers' World covers the Iraqi soccer players who were shot in Ramadi for supposedly collaborating with Americans (so said the "gunmen" who shot them, acccording to a International Herald Tribune report). Here is what the IHT says happened:

In the killing of the soccer players Thursday, three cars carrying 10 men pulled up at a community playground less than 90 meters, about 300 feet, from Ramadi's main government building. A soccer match was under way between two neighborhood teams.
The men poured out of the cars and grabbed two of the players.They tied the players' hands and tried to drag them toward the cars. Both struggled to get away, but the men shot them to death.
Khalid al-Ghargholi, the team's manager, said the attackers "started yelling 'This is the destiny of anyone who works with secret police.' They were referring to the Salvation Council of Anbar." That is the name of a group around Sheik Abu Resha, a Sunni who has opposed armed groups in the area and who has ties to the Iraqi government and the Americans.
The person the team's manager is referring to as Sheik Abu Resha is the person this blog (and most papers) have been referring to as Sheik Sattar, head of the Abu Resha tribe in the Anbar Province of which Ramadi is the capital of Anbar Province, the area which al Qaeda and its affiliates have renamed the Islamic State of Iraq.


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Wednesday, March 7, 2007

Images from Saudi Arabia


Saudi, originally uploaded by Riyadhi.

Who knew. See more of Riyadhi's photos here.

Images from Saudi Arabia


Riyadh Desert, originally uploaded by Riyadhi.

Who knew that this is what the Riyadh desert looked like in spring?

Images from Arabia


Bedouin thoughts, originally uploaded by BidWiya.

This is what I thought the desert looked like.

Images from Iran

Watch a slideshow here.


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Iran: And now for a recommended reading list

Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and coauthor of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos, gives an overview of the best and worst books on Iran in the Middle East Quarterly.

His reviews are both insightful and fun, especially if you enjoy seeing some highly-regarded experts skewered.

Here's an example of one of his keen insights and something everyone should appreciate about the state of scholarship inside Iran:

Although many Arab societies take the attitude that information is power and information shared is power lost, Iranian researchers collect and publish detailed statistics on delicate political issues. Similarly, whereas many Arab governments disregard scholarly examination of their own country, at least until the rise of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Republic's institutions sponsored studies on controversial historical and social issues.... To be sure, there are limits Iranian scholars cross only at their peril—criticism of the Islamic Republic's theological underpinnings, for example—but Iranians' positive attitudes toward scholarship cannot be understated.
And here is another of his insights, this one something you should know about the state of press freedom in Iran:

In a striking paradox, though, for a country so open to scholarship, the Iranian regime tightly controls mass media in order to monopolize interpretation of current political issues. That control extends not only to Iran's mass media but also to the access given to Western reporters. Those who speak out of turn to Western journalists are punished. The rule seems to be: Information and analysis is fine so long as no one notices them—that is, so long as they remain confined to the obscure scholarly and intellectual circles—but anything destined for the masses, Western as well as Iranian, must be carefully crafted.
What this adds up to, suggests Clawson, is that "a good rule of thumb for learning about Iran [would be] to read the obscure scholarly books and ignore anything that sells well."

Also to be avoided, says Clawson, are most books written by academics at prestigious Western universities.

Here are the books that Clawson suggests you don't need to bother reading:

Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty by Ali Gheissari (at Brown University) and Vali Nasr (at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Council on Foreign Relations) - a "rehash" says Clawson, "[of] stories told elsewhere with as much insight."

Ali Ansari's (St. Andrews University) Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Conflict in the Middle East is plagued by what Clawson describes as an unwillingness to confront "the ideological hostility of Iranian power-holders, who have little use for Western-oriented intellectuals like Ansari and his friends," according to Clawson.

Also not worth the effort, suggests Clawson, is Nikki Keddie's Modern Iran. Though he acknowledges that this is "perhaps the most influential book, at least among the university student population" and that Keddie, a UCLA historian emeritus, has knowledge that runs deep, so too do her liberal politics, says Clawson, and they, he suggests, undermine her scholarship.

Worst among recent books by Western-based academics in Clawson's view, is Brown University's William Beeman's The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other. For starters, Clawson writes:
It is disappointing to find a full professor at an Ivy League school writing a book that claims to examine how Iran views the United States while the author cites only four articles or books in the Persian language....The failure to cite primary sources is more troubling given Beeman's intemperate language, more appropriate for talk radio than scholarship.
This is unfortunate, says Clawson, because:

As a linguistic anthropologist, [Beeman] would be well placed to analyze Iranian rhetoric and to elaborate upon the cultural context for themes used in speeches, textbooks, and television images. Instead, he ignores what Iranians themselves are saying, writing, and filming, preferring instead to cite what Westerners writing in English say about Iranians. That is typical of the critics of U.S. policy towards Iran: they themselves make little effort to read or listen to the extensive material available from Iran, and then they project onto the U.S. government their own ignorance of what the Iranian regime projects.
There are exceptions to his rule of thumb. Most notably, says Clawson, is Harvard's Charles Kurzman's The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. He describes Kurzman's book as the "definitive account of the Islamic Revolution" and says "no serious historian can write about these events without consulting it."

Clawson also likes Ray Takeyh's Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. Takeyh, who used to work for Clawson, is described as "an excellent writer" and his book, writes Clawson, "[is] a pleasure to read." He does criticize him, however for "[slipping at times] into simple assertions of the usual liberal shibboleths, for instance, blaming the hard-liners' success on U.S. hostility."

Also a "must-read" according to Clawson is Massoume Price's Iran's Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook. This London-trained anthropologist, says Clawson, "shows that Iran very much remains a Persian empire: a country in which Persians dominate a mosaic of ethnic and religious groups." She gets criticized for "[skipping] too quickly over Islam's slow permeation of Iran."

Dartmouth professor Gene Garthwaite's The Persians is also well-worth reading, according to Clawson, who describes it as "that rarity: a readable, historical introduction rooted deeply in the scholarly literature. "

As far as Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi's Iran Awakening: A Memoir of Revolution and Hope, is concerned, Clawson says the book only goes to show how strangely resistent Ebadi is to the lessons of her experience. In Clawson's words, "she remains committed to the revolution that has enslaved her."

If you want to insight into the lives of ordinary Iranians, Clawson suggests going to the blogosphere. But since this isn't so easy for non-Farsi-speakers, here are two books that can help you bridge the gap:

We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs by Nasrin Alavi.
The Soul of Iran: A Nation's Journey to Freedom by Afshin Molavi.

Do read Clawson's whole review as I haven't done him justice.