An Iraqi speaks: Why Iraq is more important to Al Qaeda than Afghanistan

Mohammed at Iraq the Model, live from Baghdad, explains why we shouldn't compare Iraq to Afghanistan:

Iraq can simply not be equated with Afghanistan which the bulk of al-Qaeda largely abandoned after few weeks of battles—that doesn't sound like al-Qaeda!

Iraq, weak after a war that toppled the regime but rich-relatively-with resources and scientific base is a greater temptation than Afghanistan, and at the same time the possibility of a democracy arising in Iraq posed a great threat to the ideology of caliph state. Therefore al-Qaeda and whoever is backing it directly or indirectly felt they had to move the front to Iraq instead of staying in Afghanistan.

Let's imagine that the world left Iraq alone before the country is able to defend itself and let it fall in the hands of extremists, what would happen then?

Can we compare the opium fields with the massive oilfields of Mesopotamia? Can we afford to leave these resources in the service of the terrorists?

[...The infrastructure of Iraq], while still humble compared to advanced countries, could be very dangerous if captured by terrorists.

An Islamic state in Iraq whether to be led by al-Qaeda or one of the local extreme religious parties would be an enormous threat to the security of the region and the world and a turning point that might encourage fence-sitters to join the terrorists…the tide would be much more difficult to stop then.

It's true that what's happening in Iraq doesn't meet the ambitions of Iraqis or Americans and everyone admits that many mistakes were made...

But abandoning this front or failing to recognize its priority is a terrible mistake that can lead to disastrous consequences to all of us.

John Howard: Why a timed withdrawal won't work in Iraq

Australian Prime Minister John Howard explains to Parliament House Down Under why Australia must stay the course in Iraq. His whole speech is worth reading, but here are some key excerpts:

For the record, let me state clearly why I believe a timetable for premature withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq would invite disastrous strategic and humanitarian consequences.

First, it would undercut the forces of moderation in Iraq at the precise moment when they have a chance – perhaps the last chance – to stabilise their country. Sectarian violence would escalate, with the Sunnis abandoning the unity government and parliament.

Second, it would lead to more widespread and extreme human rights abuses, more internally displaced Iraqi civilians and further outflow of refugees to neighbouring states.

Third, a precipitate withdrawal would give a green light to those looking to make Iraq a platform for global terror. With Al Qaeda and other extremists claiming withdrawal as a victory, this would likely inspire more terrorism outside Iraq, including in South East Asia. Iraq is undeniably a frontline in the fight against international terrorism. The terrorists view it as such.

Fourth, it would further destabilise what is already the world's most unstable region, perhaps igniting a wider war in the Middle East. Any prospect of resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict would lie in tatters.

And fifth, it would be a crushing blow to America's global leadership, emboldening those who, like Osama Bin Laden, have argued all along that America is a "weak horse" on which no one should depend.

...As such, it may be clever politics to portray Afghanistan as the 'good war' and Iraq as the 'bad war', but it is a position cloaked in folly.

Why is it right that Australia and its allies prevail in Afghanistan but fail in Iraq? Why is it okay for Iraq to become a safe haven for global terror but not Afghanistan?

Why is building Afghanistan's security capability more compelling than building Iraq's? And why is a massive setback to American global leadership fine in one place but not in another?

...The Opposition's current position on Iraq is that the conflict is a civil war, requiring solely a political solution. Labor argues that the key to that political solution is a 'staged' withdrawal of Australian and US military forces to create pressure for the Sunni and the Shia to reach a political accommodation.

In my view, both the analysis and the policy prescription are fundamentally flawed. Success in Iraq requires both a military and a political strategy, each reinforcing the other.

Sectarian violence in Iraq is clearly a major problem. But despite being put under enormous pressure neither the Iraqi Army nor the national government have split along sectarian lines. That really would be a disaster, and it is this disaster that our strategy seeks to avert.

...We will be able to leave Iraq. But we cannot do so responsibly until we have some confidence that the Iraqi security forces are in a position to defend Iraq'sdemocratically-elected government and the Iraqi people, whether from terrorists, insurgents or sectarian strife.