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Tuesday, August 7, 2007

Ahmed, Timbuktu



Ahmed, originally uploaded by mobilevirgin.

More than you ever imagined behind this door in Timbuktu


timbuktu door, originally uploaded by roadwarrior.

Timbuktu rising

If the Gulf countries are resuscitating the Silk Road, look what the plans are for Timbuktu. (That's in Mali, in case you forgot your high school geography). From the New York Times:

A surge of interest in ancient books, hidden for centuries in houses along Timbuktu’s dusty streets and in leather trunks in nomad camps, is raising hopes that Timbuktu — a city whose name has become a staccato synonym for nowhere — may once again claim a place at the intellectual heart of Africa. . .

This ancient city, a prisoner of the relentless sands of the Sahara and a changing world that prized access to the sea over the grooves worn by camel hooves across the dunes, is on the verge of a renaissance.

“We want to build an Alexandria for black Africa,” said Mohamed Dicko, director of the Ahmed Baba Institute, a government-run library in Timbuktu. “This is our chance to regain our place in history.”
Mr. Dicko isn't working alone either. The South African government is providing assistance, as are governments and NGOs in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. As the Times report continues:
This new chapter in the story of Timbuktu, whose fortunes fell in the twilight of the Middle Ages, is almost as extraordinary as those that preceded it.

The geography that has doomed Timbuktu to obscurity in the popular imagination for half a millennium was once the reason for its greatness. It was founded as a trading post by nomads in the 11th century and later became part of the vast Mali Empire, then ultimately came under the control of the Songhai Empire.

For centuries it flourished because it sat between the great superhighways of the era — the Sahara, with its caravan routes carrying salt, cloth, spices and other riches from the north, and the Niger River, which carried gold and slaves from the rest of West Africa.

Traders brought books and manuscripts from across the Mediterranean and Middle East, and books were bought and sold in Timbuktu — in Arabic and local languages like Songhai and Tamashek, the language of the Tuareg people.

Timbuktu was home to the University of Sankore, which at its height had 25,000 scholars. An army of scribes, gifted in calligraphy, earned their living copying the manuscripts brought by travelers. Prominent families added those copies to their own libraries. As a result, Timbuktu became a repository of an extensive and eclectic collection of manuscripts.
But this Golden Age, unfortunately, wasn't to last forever:
Moroccan invaders deposed the Songhai empire in 1591, and the new rulers were hostile to the community of scholars, who were seen as malcontents. Facing persecution, many fled, taking many books with them.

West African sea routes overtook the importance of the old inland desert and river trade, and the city began its long decline. When the first European explorers stumbled across the once fabled city, they were stunned at its decrepitude. René Caillié, a French explorer who arrived here in 1828, said it was “a mass of ill-looking houses built of earth.”

Mr. Caillié’s description remains accurate today.
Let's hope Timbuktu gets its second shot at being the intellectual capital of Africa.

Somali


Abdul Arts, regular readers will recall, is a Somali refugee living in Egypt. I hope he's not feeling too homesick over there.

Monday, August 6, 2007

More tribes uniting against terrorism in Iraq


Centcom reports:

Eighteen paramount tribal leaders representing 14 of the major tribes in Diyala province, Iraq, swore on the Quran and signed a peace agreement unifying the tribes in the battle against terrorism during a meeting at the Baqubah Government Center Aug. 2. . .
“The tribal leaders can change the hearts of the people,” said Sheik Mahmood Abdul-Shinba Al-Hassani. “Instead of cheering for the terrorists driving through the streets, the people will cheer for the Iraqi security forces in the streets.”

“The terrorists are not that many,” said Sheik Adnan Abdul-Mehdi Al-Anbaki. “We have to stand together and we need to kill the terrorists. We know who they are.”
As the Centcom dispatch continued:
After discussing tribal differences and why it is important to unite, the sheiks signed a reconciliation agreement and swore over the Quran as a promise to uphold the agreement.

As stated in the Quran, “And hold fast, all together, by the rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves,” the sheiks agreed to ten conditions.

Some conditions of the peace treaty include ending tribal conflicts and attacks; cooperating with the ISF; fighting al-Qaida, militia groups and other terrorist organizations; working with the security forces to eradicate corrupt members; returning displaced families to their homes; reporting and removing improvised explosive devices; and respecting all sects, religions and women’s rights.
Sounds like it could be a peace plan to me.

Saturday, August 4, 2007

Ethnic view of Pakistan

Afghanistan's main ethnic groups


National Geographic Ethnic Map of Afghanistan

Hazara girl, uploaded on June 27, 2007 by aghaznawi.

See Aghaznawi's photoessay on the Hazara here.

Hazara history has it that this Central Asian people are direct descendants of Genghis Khan. Or maybe their ancestors were the people who constructed the Buddhas of Bamyan that the Taliban destroyed in 2001.

Friday, August 3, 2007

Report from the front


Following is my email interview with Waliullah Rahmani, an analyst who covers terrorism and related issues for the Jamestown Foundation. He is also a correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and was an analyst for saudidebate.com.

Based in his native Afghanistan, and fluent in Farsi, Pushto, Urdu, and English, I sought out Rahmani since he is one of the very few experts in this area who has this level of linguistic penetration and actually reports from ground zero, so to speak.

Who are you?

I am Waliullah Rahmani. I studied management and now work on Terrorism, political Islam and Middle East issues.

How did you end up covering jihad in Afghanistan and would you rather be running some company?

First, I have to say, what is going on in Afghanistan is not Jihad. It is an insurgency. The violence and extremist actions are directed against a democratic and legitimate government that was selected by the Afghans and supported by the international community. We do not have Jihad in Afghanistan but only anti-government extremists who call themselves the Taliban who are supported by Al Qaida and engaged in anti-government activities. They are not widely supported..

So why is what we see in Afghanistan not Jihad?

First, while the jihadis may call this jihad, there is no basis for this. Jihad has specific standards. And what is going on in Afghanistan has nothing to do with how Islam defines it.

Can you explain?

The very common meaning of Islamic Jihad or holy war is to fight against the nonIslamic countries, occupier, or the infidel forces. Based on this definition, the extremists' war against an Islamic government based on an Islamic constitution and against foreign forces who are under the supervision of this government and have entered the country with agreement of that for reconstruction and security of Afghanistan is not Jihad. It is called Baghawat (insurgency) against a legitimate government.

So how did you end up to covering terrorism, insurgency, and extremism?

Well I am a person who belongs to this country (Afghanistan) - good or bad. Like every Afghan, the main issue for me is insecurity. So we have to devote a lot of effort to securing this country which means combating terrorism and violence. Everyone has to do their share. I felt these issues had to be covered from an Afghan prospective. We could not have just Westerners providing the in-depth analysis to policy makers in the Afghan political arena. So I’m doing what I think I should be doing for my country.

Is your work risky?

Certainly. We face the Taliban, Al Qaida, and other extremists who want to suffocate every voice. Ajmal Naghashbandi, the Afghan journalist who was beheaded earlier this year in Helmand Province, reminded everyone what could happen to anyone who dares to speak or write the truth about what is going on here.

Well you talked generally of threats. Do you face any threat in your field work?


I do. In Afghanistan every thinker who wants to research in the field faces many threats. For example, researchers and thinkers run the risk of being called spies for the government or foreign forces because research is something strange for them. Because of this, the Taliban kill journalists and brutally.

So how do you protect yourself?

Well, I use different methods. First, I never let anyone really know where I am going when I travel to the south or other dangerous areas. Second, I wear local clothes. Since I have a beard and and speak the local languages, I can blend in fairly well. The goal is to be able to pass myself off as an ordinary passenger. I am also careful about never appearing in any Afghan media, so that not many people know who I am or what I really do.

Who is the most talented jihadist or strategist commander?

Since Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani and Mullah Dadullah Taliban were killed, we have not seen any leader emerge with any similar strategic vision and leadership ability. Mansoor Dadullah, Mullah Dadullah’s half-brother, who was named as his replacement is not thought to have the same strategic depth or command presence his brother did. He has been able to carry on the violence, terror and suicide attacks, however.

I saw you reported that Mullah Omar objected to his selection but apparently was overruled by Al Qaeda. Why and what does this mean?

When Mullah Dadullah joined the Taliban, he was a soldier but soon became a high-ranking commander. During his command, he was willful and didn’t care much about Mullah Omar’s orders. Once during the Taliban’s governance in Kabul, he entered the capital and ordered his soldiers to eat food which had been prepared for the cabinet members’ lunch.

So Mullah Omar opposed the selection of Mullah Mansoor because Omar thought that Mansoor might be too much like his brother, Mullah Dadullah. But Al Qaeda supported the Mullah Mansoor leadership style. They wanted a brutal commander to lead their Neo-Taliban. Al Qaida wanted to replace Mullah Dadullah with someone who would act like Zarqawi had in Iraq. This shows that there is a wide rift between the Taliban and Al Qaida.

Do you see the jihadists’ base of support growing?

Unfortunately yes. Reports from the south and other parts of the country suggest that the extremists’ activities are intensifying and that locals are involved. An officer of the Afghan National Army told me recently that four years ago he could go anywhere with his vehicle and alone. Now he can’t even get from his home in Kabul to the base in Midan Wardak Province fifteen kilometers away without bodyguards. Perhaps it’s like the early years of the Jihad against Soviets. We now have the Taliban targeting military bases just as the Mujahideen used to attack the Russians.

So they don’t target civilians in Afghanistan?

No, they do kill civilians but don’t want to continue doing so it appears because in suicide attacks civilians are usually the victims. The Taliban is now dedicated to stopping the civilian killings, but they are still happy to kidnap people.

How can villagers really like these people, don’t they see what they are?

Well, Afghan villagers are mostly illiterate, extremely religious, traditional, and superstitious and the Taliban knows how to capture the imagination of this type of mentality.

Also the Afghan government and coalition forces have not been careful enough in avoiding civilian casualties and any time civilians are killed, you have villagers who then want to join the anti-government forces so they can take revenge.

The Taliban’s extreme dogma and anti-government stance seems reasonable to the villagers.

What motivates the Taliban?

Well I don’t know about their real motives, because these cannot be probed. But according to their actions and speeches, they say they are against the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. They call these forces occupiers. Second, they call the present Afghan state a client of the foreigners. And third, they say their goal is to revive God’s government in God’s land, - that is, Amarat Islami.

You don’t think you’ll see a similar revolt in Afghanistan as we’re seeing in places like Anbar Province in Iraq where the Sunnis have figured out that Al Qaeda is also a foreign occupying force and one that is harsher and has longer designs than the Americans and their coalition?

No, I don’t think the situation might change in this way in Afghanistan. What you see in Iraq is completely different from Afghanistan. Al Qaida is Sunni , comprised mostly of Wahhabi Muslims and it is behind most of the sectarian violence in Iraq. But after years of violence, the Hanafi Sunnis of Iraq are now rethinking their alliance with the Wahhabis in Al Qaeda because they were a nation as Iraqis for many decades.

But what we see in Afghanistan is different from Iraq. In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was born and raised. Then this jihad network established subgroups outside of Afghanistan, in other countries.

Afghans especially in the southern and eastern provinces care about their traditions. In Pushtunwali and traditional Afghan culture, if a person comes into the domain of a tribe seeking shelter, he is respected as a guest to the extent that the members of the tribe would give their life for this guest rather than turn him in to his enemy. These types of traditions are the obstacle to any revolt against Al Qaeda in many parts of Afghanistan.

So Afghanistan is losing yet another generation to Jihad?

Unfortunately, the answer to that question is yes. In the past five years, once again, Afghan youth have lost almost all access to other types of opportunities.

Can you talk about some of the friends you have lost? Do your Hazara friends subscribe to the Taliban’s jihad too?

My friends have not joined the Taliban. Because they are Hazara and mostly Shia and they don’t subscribe to the Taliban’s insurgency.

But there may be some Sunni Hazara, members of Hizb-e Islami and other Islamist parties, who may have joined.


What is your advice on how to counter Jihad?

Well as I said before, Jihad has conditions and every brutal action against humans should not be called Jihad. It’s not only inaccurate, it is also counter productive to keep using this word jihad. Because even if this serves the jihadists’ purposes, you do not want ordinary Muslims feeling that they have to join this jihad to fight a war they are being told is against Islam.

So to counter the violence and insurgency then, first and foremost, the government has to provide economic opportunity for its citizens. As long as there is high unemployment, the Taliban will have a recruitment angle. Then the government also has to extend services to the villagers. Right now only Kabul is being properly served and Afghanistan is not only Kabul. Also, government corruption must be reined in otherwise people won’t trust the government.

The government also needs to counter the Taliban’s message. It needs to encourage the moderate interpretation of Islam to counter the fanatical one. Afghans are a traditional and deeply religious people. The mullahs play key roles so the government needs to promote moderate clerics who can counter the radical interpretation of Islam being espoused by the extremists.

Finally, something has to be done to diminish the ethnic tension in the country. The government can’t stand by as Uzbeks or Hazara get slaughtered.

Why are the Uzbeks and Hazara being attacked?

Well Afghanistan is a country where tribe and ethnicity is very important for people. So though there is a democratic government in place, many officials only work to strengthen their tribe or ethnic group.

In the case of the Uzbeks, the most sensitive issue was the violence which occurred in Shiberghan where many Uzbek civilians were killed. The governor was not Uzbek, so there was ethnic tension.

In the case of the Hazara people, the nomadic Kochies came to Hazarajat and ethnic tensions flared and many Hazaras were killed. Unfortunately, some people were under the influence of the Taliban and it almost became a national crisis. After 50 days of violence in the Behsud district, the Shia politicians in the central government decided unofficially to leave if something was not done to force the Kochies to leave the district.

And do you really think that any central government based in Kabul could really gain control of all of Afghanistan? Isn’t this just some Western pipedream? Would a better approach be to hold the tribes responsible for their areas of influence as opposed to politicians in Kabul?

Based on democracy, a government never can implement its orders and demands through force or brutal actions. What the government can do is pave the ground for getting elected leaders in every province and district.

Unfortunately, now whoever is sent to a province is just responsible to President Karzai or the interior minister, not the people. So these provincial leaders never need to take into account the peoples’ expectations.

If the provinces could elect their own leaders, they could hold them accountable. It doesn’t matter if it’s federalism or democracy - in my view, this is the only way to strengthen the central government and secure and develop Afghanistan.

Thank you for your comments, Rahmani. May God keep you out of harm’s way.

Sharon, you are welcome. Thanks for your prayers for me.

Wednesday, August 1, 2007

The detainee wants to stay in Gitmo

The London Times reports:

Ahmed Belbacha fears that he will be tortured or killed if the United States goes ahead with plans to return him to his native Algeria. . .

“Ahmed is being held in camp six, the harshest part of Guantanamo,” he said. “His cell is all steel, there are no windows, he is not allowed to communicate with other prisoners and he gets just two hours exercise each day in a metal cage.

“He says his cell in Guantanamo is like a grave and that although it sounds crazy he would rather stay in those conditions than go back to Algeria. The fact is that he is really, really scared about what might happen to him in Algeria.”
According to what he says, this guy has had some pretty bad luck in life:
Mr Belbacha, 38, fled Algeria in 1999 at the height of the brutal civil war between the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Algerian Government.

He was an accountant for a state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, when he was called for a second spell of military service. The call-up was followed by death threats to him and his family from the GIA, which killed thousands of state employees during the 1990s. . .

Mr Belbacha claims that in July 2001 he was persuaded by friends to go to Pakistan to undertake religious study. While there he crossed the border into Afghanistan.

When the US-led invasion began in response to the September 11 attacks he crossed back into Pakistan. He claims that in December 2001 he was apprehended by villagers near Peshawar, in northwest Pakistan, and sold to the authorities for a bounty.

Today's lesson on freedom of expression

Comes from Wall Street Journal Daniel Schwammenthal who writes:

A British court last week sentenced four men to up to six years in prison for inciting murder and racial hatred. The men were among the hundreds of Muslims who in February of last year met after Friday prayers at London's Regent's Park mosque and marched to Denmark's embassy to protest the Muhammad cartoons that had been published in Danish newspapers. Like other such rallies, this protest descended into calls for terror and the beheadings of those who "insult Islam."
As he explains the law in Britain:
Even in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, where freedom of expression has always known fewer limitations than in Continental Europe, it is not an absolute right. Laws regulating obscenity and hate speech have long set boundaries for what can be considered legitimate speech.

In this case, the slogans the men were chanting and had written on their placards were more than offensive; they were calls to mass murder. They were not vague threats that a society could afford to tolerate. Instead, by referring to actual acts of terror, the men's words took on a concrete, menacing character. Among the threats they shouted were: "U.K. you will pay, 7/7 on its way," "Oh Allah, we want to see another 9/11," "Bomb, bomb Denmark, bomb, bomb U.S.A." and "Bomb, bomb the U.K."
As he continues:
In fighting the war on terror, the challenge for Western societies is usually defined as finding the right balance between security and preserving the freedoms that make our democratic societies worth defending. But that's not the whole story. Terrorists and their supporters threaten not just our lives; they also threaten our freedom -- including our freedom of speech. . .

If the the state is not allowed to stop Islamists' incitement to murder and terror, their speech may eventually be the only one that remains "free."

A Somalian refugee in Egypt sends his condolences to Korea

As Abdul the cartoonist writes:

Dear Sharon, I send you this cartoon about the Taliban hiding the hostages of Korea and the US military searching it..I want to express my sorrow about killing Korean Hostages. It's sad news..I wish you will publish.
Happy to oblige, Abdul, and thanks.

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

Empower the tribes! It will work!

The Christian Science Monitor reports:

By killing two South Korean hostages and refusing to release the remaining 21, including 18 women, the Taliban is taking a new path that suggests it is becoming an Afghan branch of Al Qaeda.

In the past 18 months, the Taliban has adopted more aggressive tactics – such as kidnappings and suicide bombings – imported directly from the Al Qaeda-led global jihad.
As the Monitor continues:
For Hajji Spandagul, a tribal elder from eastern Afghanistan, it is abhorrent. "This is not the culture of Afghanistan – to take women hostage, especially in the tribal culture," he says, waving his large, weathered hands forcefully.

Here in a guesthouse for tribal elders visiting Kabul, he sits with several of his colleagues from around the country. In the past, elders like Mr. Spandagul have been able to intervene in hostage situations. They often live in areas beyond the government's control, meaning they must remain neutral, carving out whatever level of peace they can between the Taliban and the Kabul.

"We are threatened on both sides," says Jamaluddin Alizai, an elder from Kandahar Province, where the Taliban resistance is centered. "During the night, the Taliban come to my area, and I have to give them food or they will kill us, then the government comes in the morning and says, 'Why did you give them food?' "
As one former member of the Taliban, Abdul Salam Raketi, now a lawmaker, told the Monitor:
"It is really dangerous for the future of the Taliban," he says. "If people are supporting the Taliban a little, they won’t support them at all anymore because the Taliban did not listen to their elders in negotiations."

Elder Spandagul calls this the work of Chechens and Pakistanis who have come here to wage global jihad – and Afghan elders are powerless to stop them. In times past, tribes had their own militia, but these were disbanded with the establishment of the Western-backed government, and nothing has risen in their place. Many police patrols are unable to venture a mile from their posts.
Notice that once again, Al Qaeda has to employ foreign mercenaries to do its dirty work. As to what to do to counter the Taliban in this area. Well here's a clue:
Mr. Alizai of Kandahar recalls the day that a group of French soldiers came and asked why the Taliban were attacking from his district. "Because I have empty hands," he says. "If we don't have weapons how can we defend ourselves? They come and cut our necks."
As the Monitor reports spells it out for us:
In areas so unconnected to the broader world, tribes still have a role to play in keeping order. But they are increasingly ground between a government seeking the trappings of a modern, centralized power structure and an insurgency seeking to further its own global ends.
As someone very wise once pointed out to me, the dumb Westerner that I am: tribal justice, swift and brutal.

On the Iraqi parliament taking a vacation...

Darioush Bayandor, who modestly describes himself as "a student of history living in retirement in Switzerland after a career in diplomacy and in UN humanitarian work" had an interesting perspective in a remarks he posted on a closed forum ( reprinted here with permisssion of the author):

In his appearance Sunday in CNN's Late Edition Rep. Charlie Rangel of New York criticized not just the Iraqi national assembly for going on a summer recess but was "outraged" also to see Iraqis played soccer while American soldiers were fighting in suffocating heat of summer.

I have every sympathy for predicament of young Americans who risk their lives fighting in Iraq. But I was frustrated that no one around reminded the congressman that if American soldiers are there it's because the US invited itself to Iraq with approval of the Congress (little matters that Rangel himself did not support the resolution) and having created in Iraq that monumental mess it's myopic and scornful for an American congressman
to want to deny the Iraqis even this fleeting joy of a cup victory and a glimpse of the lost national identity.
His silence on the vacationing politicians did strike me as conspicuous. I don't have anything nice to say about their taking a break either, but following the diplomat's lead, I'll keep my mouth shut.

Incidentally, Bayandor is a person who while he was at the U.N. assisted refugees of the Khymer Rouge as they returned to their native Cambodia, Burmese taking refuge in Bangladesh, Bosnians as they fled from Serbs, and Congolese refugees from a civil war so he clearly has some idea of how sweet the Iraqi soccer victory must have felt to this war-torn people.

More on the tribal rebels in Pakistan

According to my sources, the followers of the late Red Mosque leader are neither Al Qaeda or Taliban. This is why, I suppose, the Western media so often terms the Pakistani tribals as "Taliban-like" or "pro-Taliban."

While somebody must think this advances understanding of the situation, I have to say, I'm not in that camp.

To give you a concrete example of what I'm talking about here, let's see how the Associated Press reports about this:

Pro-Taliban fighters seized an Islamic shrine in restive northwestern Pakistan and renamed it after the Red Mosque, where dozens of militants died this month in a showdown with government forces in the capital, officials said Monday.
As I stress, notice the "pro-Taliban" fighters here as opposed to Taliban fighters as the AP would have written were in fact these rebels Taliban.

As the AP continues:
About 70 pro-Taliban militants overran the shrine of renowned Pashtun freedom fighter Sahib Turangzai and its adjoining mosque in Mohmand tribal region late Sunday, a militant representative said.

They evicted the mosque's caretakers, renamed it and declared their support for Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the deputy cleric of the Red Mosque, who had spearheaded an increasingly aggressive, Taliban-style anti-vice campaign in the capital.
Troops finally cracked down on the mosque and Ghazi was killed along with at least 101 other people after a weeklong siege that ended July 12.

In Mohmand, the militants vowed to set up a girls' seminary at the site — reminiscent of the one in Islamabad where the anti-vice campaign was centered and that was demolished by authorities after the siege.

"We will ensure education here for students who were dispersed after the operation against Lal Masjid in Islamabad," Khalid Omar, a man who claims to speak for the militants, said in telephone calls to journalists in Peshawar.
Again, it's the pro-Taliban and the Taliban-style rebellion as opposed to the Taliban. So why does the AP do this, the reader must certainly be wondering.

Here's my theory - and from the same report:
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is under growing pressure from Washington to crack down on the Taliban and al-Qaida.
Get it? Musharraf needs to fight these rebels under the cover of combating the Taliban and al Qaeda to please Washington, which can then feel good about having supported an ally who was on the same side in this War on Terror. Opponents of Musharraf won't object because if after all these years, Musharraf still has a Taliban problem, they know this will only diminish him and the U.S. administration that backed him. Al-Qaida loves having the rebels seen as part of their "stronghold" in Pakistan. (See what I wrote yesterday on this.) And the rebels probably don't even know what's being written about them or what the implications of all this are if they do. Literacy rates in the area we are talking about are a pathetic 18 percent so whatever their trusted sources tell them, that's what they believe. (Me too, fellows, I have to rely on trusted sources too because in this case, being able to read doesn't help much in locating reliable accounts.)

Anyway, I'd still like to get this right, so if I'm wrong here....Do please send drop me a line.

Monday, July 30, 2007

Al Qaeda's "stronghold" in Pakistan

Seems to be more myth than reality to me according to this report from the London Telegraph and all the other news I've seen lately. Anyway, let's see what we have here and you decide:

A deep split has emerged within al-Qa'eda over the wisdom of the terror network's drive to overthrow and kill Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf, according to radical Pakistani Islamists allied to the terror network. . .

Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has ordered the series of retaliatory attacks on Pakistani targets that have followed the storming of the Red Mosque, an extremist stronghold in Islamabad, by Gen Musharraf's troops this month.
As the Telegraph reports, some 200 Pakistanis been killed as a result of the Egyptian doctor's revenge strikes. Now check this detail out:
Some senior figures within al-Qa'eda are alarmed that al-Zawahiri's mission to topple and kill Gen Musharraf will provoke a Pakistani military backlash that could jeopardise their safe havens in the mountainous tribal areas on the Afghan border.
A rival so-called "Libyan faction" led by Abu Yahya al-Libi, who escaped from the US Bagram base near Kabul in 2005, apparently suspects that al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian-born doctor, is trying to position himself as bin Laden's heir presumptive with his personal crusade. Bin Laden himself is believed to be in hiding, fearful of his whereabouts being discovered.
Do you see any Pakistanis yet on your radar screen? I mean aside from the victims of these Al Qaeda attacks? I know I don't. Now get this:
The US officials believe al-Zawahiri is running anti-Musharraf operations without consulting other leaders, hoping to foment a revolt that will result in an Islamic regime taking control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. They are investigating reports of other factions which want to consolidate their operating bases on the Pakistan-Afghan border.
"Hoping to foment a revolt" - you got that? Zawahiri is hoping he can get some Pakistanis rallied to his fight. Now check out this passage:
The high stakes were brought home by a new US National Intelligence Estimate this month. The report concluded that a resurgent al-Qa'eda, now based in Pakistan's lawless tribal belt, has regained the same strength and organisation as before the September 11, 2001 attacks that prompted the US assault that drove it from Afghanistan.
The "same strength and organization"? Let's recap for a second here. Bin Laden is no where to be found he's so scared (or so dead). Al Qaeda seems to be having some serious management problems. And the only Pakistanis anyone can say with certainty that are part of this Al Qaeda stronghold are the ones getting blown up - or having their kids menaced because Al Qaeda doesn't like girls going to school. Yeah, sure, same strength and organization alright.

Anyway, in case you were wondering what the intelligence genuises in the U.S. suggest doing, this is what the Telegraph found:
US intelligence has repeated warnings to the White House that it is probably only a matter of time before al-Qa'eda stages another major attack inside the US, organised from its Pakistani strongholds. A significant faction inside the CIA wants the US to launch attacks within Pakistan to strike at al-Qa'eda now, without authorisation from Gen Musharraf.
Pakistani strongholds? Again, those places where they've been bombing and shooting up schools? Anybody ever hear of Anbar Province in Iraq?

I'd bet anything that the Pakistani tribals are a lot less stupid about Al Qaeda than these US intelligence agents seem to be. In fact, I give them as much credit as the Sunnis in Anbar - in Al Qaeda's other "stronghold."

Kalam, Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan

Great that it's "Islamic" but does it make money?

That seems to be the critical question in the Islamic world at least, just as I suspected (from the Financial Times):

Islamic finance may be fashionable in international markets but it is not making much of a splash at home. Take Indonesia. Just 1 per cent of bonds issued by the world’s most populous Muslim country this year were Islamic and it boasts just $5m worth of Shariah-compliant funds.
As the report continues:
It is hard to avoid the suspicion that Islamic finance is not a huge growth driver for Asia. For one, traders grumble that the market is illiquid since the banks tend to buy and hold bonds. Meantime, much of the “new” Islamic finance appears to be cannibalising existing business.

Could the next victory for Iraq be Iraq itself?

Maybe, say two analysts, Michael E. O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution and Kenneth M. Pollack of the Saban Center. As they write in today's New York Times, while they have "harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq" after their recent 8-day trip to check out how Iraq is faring under the new surge plan, they report that "significant changes taking place." And even go so far as to be optimistic that "a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with" seems within reach. As they write:

In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.
The situation is not perfect yet, as these two formerly harsh critics duly note - and the usual suspects - politicians - are largely to blame:
Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.

Sunday, July 29, 2007

Victory for Iraqi National Team

Iraq fan